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ABSTRACT
This Article advocates that securities regulators promulgate rules based upon taking
into consideration their impacts upon investors' and others' affect, happiness, and
trust. Examples of these impacts are consumer optimism, financial stress, anxiety
over how thoroughly securities regulators deliberate over proposed rules, investor
confidence in securities disclosures, market exuberance, social moods, and subjec-
tive well-being. These variables affect and are affected by traditional financial vari-
ables, such as consumer debt, expenditures, and wealth; corporate investment;
initial public offerings; and securities market demand, liquidity, prices, supply, and
volume. This Article proposes that securities regulators can and should evaluate
rules based upon measures of affect, happiness, and trust in addition to standard
observable financial variables. This Article concludes that the organic statutes of the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission are indeterminate despite man-
dating that federal securities laws consider efficiency among other goals. This Arti-
cle illustrates analysis of affective impacts of these financial regulatory policies:
mandatory securities disclosures; gun-jumping rules for publicly registered offer-
ings; financial education or literacy campaigns; statutory or judicial default rules
and menus; and continual reassessment and revision of rules. These regulatory pol-
icies impact and are impacted by investors' and other people's affect, happiness,
and trust. Thus, securities regulators can and should evaluate such affective impacts
to design effective legal policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (SOX),' in particular, section 404's internal
financial control provisions, has generated a great deal of controversy. Four legal
scholars considered evidence from empirical studies utilizing Cost-Benefit Analysis
(CBA),2 to conclude that SOX had modest benefits that were hard to document,
but very large measurable compliance costs. Other corporate law scholars ex-
pressed opposite attitudes towards SOX.4 This debate over SOX raises a pair of
related foundational normative questions, namely, what should be the appropriate
way to evaluate securities laws, and what should be the role of CBA in the evalua-
tion of securities laws.
CBA is "a set of procedures for defining and comparing benefits and costs. In
this sense it is a way of organizing and analyzing data as an aid to thinking."5
Kenneth J. Arrow, a 1972 Nobel Laureate in economics,6 stated that "some sense of
1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.).
2. Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality
Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251 (2005) (proposing that future regulations emulate Title VII
of SOX in requiring empirical research and corresponding responsive adjustments or improvements); Donald
C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley Revisiting Corporate Law's "Duty of Care as Responsibility
for Systems,"31 J. CORP. L. 949 (2006) (explaining controversy over Part 404 of SOX in terms of indeterminacy
over costs and benefits of internal controls); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002) (arguing that SOX is unlikely to do
a better job than self-correcting markets); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.]. 1521 (2005) (evaluating substantive corporate governance mandates of
SOX based upon relevant empirical accounting and finance literature); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws,
40 Hous. L. REV. 77, 83-90 (2003); Larry E. Ribstein, International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxey: Raising the
Rent on US Law, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 299 (2003); Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years, 2005 NEW
ZEALAND L. REV. 365; Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279.
3. See generally HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE (2006).
4. See Robert B. Ahdieh, From "Federalization" to "Mixed Governance" in Corporate Law: A Defense of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 721 (2005); William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules
Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023 (2003) (finding SOX begins a political process intended
over time to produce a new regulatory regime); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy
Rhetoric, Light Reform (And it Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003) (reading SOX as being a modest
act); Brett H. McDonnell, Sarbanes-Oxley, Fiduciary Duties, and the Conduct of Officers and Directors, EUR. Bus.
ORG. L. REV. (forthcoming) (concluding that although SOX imposes significant compliance costs, it also results
in beneficial changes in the behaviors of accountants, directors, and officers); Brett H. McDonnell, SOX Ap-
peals, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 505 (explaining how SOX induced regulators and private actors that were better
informed than Congress to undertake a new reform dynamic spurring desirable changes in U.S. corporate
governance); Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 703 (2007) (finding that although accurately performing CBA of SOX section 404 is currently impossible,
real benefits have often been overlooked while implementation costs have been overstated).
5. RICHARD 0. ZERBE, JR. & DWIGHT D. DIVELY, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 2
(1994). See generally WILLIAM KENNETH BELLINGER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICY 151-264
(2007); ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2001); ROBERT J.
BRENT, APPLIED COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2006); E.J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST-BENEFIT ANALY-
SIS (5th ed. 2007); RICHARD W. TRESCH, PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS 393-421 (2008); RICHARD 0. ZERBE, JR.
& ALLEN S. BELLAS, A PRIMER FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS (2006).
6. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1972, http://nobelprize.
orgleconomics/laureates/1972/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
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rational balancing of ends and means must be understood to play a major role in
our understanding of ourselves and our social role."7 Most economists advocate
that policy makers and regulators can and should engage in CBA involving estimat-
ing quantitatively monetary costs and benefits.8 A creative recent application of
CBA to corporate governance reform examines costs and benefits to increasing
diversity of corporate boards of directors.9
The important and non-trivial question of whether the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) should routinely engage in formal CBA is already the subject of
another article.' Thus, this Article brackets that question and accepts as a working
hypothesis that such U.S. financial regulators as the SEC can and should benefit
from utilizing (or in fact inevitably will utilize, at least implicitly) some form of
CBA." This is a reasonable hypothesis because there are several economic, legal,
philosophical, and pragmatic arguments in favor of informing policy by some type
of CBA.l g But, this is a hypothesis that could be false either because CBA is too
costly or difficult to consistently and successfully implement. In other words, CBA
itself might fail a CBA test because its costs may exceed its benefits. Whether CBA
would pass a CBA is an open empirical question.'3
Independent of whether securities regulators can, do, should, or will engage in
CBA, this Article advocates that securities regulators also should consider affective
and subjective well-being impacts of policies, an effort that would entail measuring
investors' confidence, happiness, and moods in addition to respecting process con-
cerns.' 4 This Article thus promotes a different and novel way to evaluate securities
regulations than is the current practice.
7. See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 15 (1974).
8. See, e.g., Luigi Zingales, The Costs and Benefits of Financial Market Regulation (Eur. Corp. Governance
Inst., Law Working Paper No. 21/2004, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=536682.
9. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales
for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 795, 837-51.
10. See generally Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Lessons from the SEC's
Stalled Mutual Fund Reform Effort, 12 STAN. LL. Bus. & FIN. 1 (2006).
11. Id. at 14-20. The thematic focus of the Securities Regulation Section of the American Association of
Law Schools annual conference was: "Do The Benefits of Securities Regulation in the United States Warrant the
Costs?" (Jan. 4, 2006). Background Materials on Current Projects, Harvard Law School, http://www.
law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/projects.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
12. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and
Safety Regulation?, 272 Sci. 221 (1996) (suggesting that CBA can play an important role in helping to inform
regulatory decision-making if utilized appropriately); see also JONATHAN BARON, JUDGMENT MISGUIDED: INTUI-
TION AND ERROR IN PUBLIC DECISION MAKING 189-93 (1998) (explaining the advantages of CBA); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 25-26 (2002) ("The strongest
arguments for CBA seem to rest not with neoclassical economics but with common sense, informed by behav-
ioral economics and cognitive psychology."). But see Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein's Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics
for Liberals, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191 (2004) (critiquing Sunstein).
13. See generally WHAT'S ECONOMICS WORTH? VALUING POLICY RESEARCH (Philip G. Pardey & Vincent H.
Smith eds., 2004).
14. See generally Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regula-
tion of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525 (2004).
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Part II analyzes how and why securities laws impact investors' and others' affect,
happiness, and trust in addition to why those impacts matter for policy evaluation.
Part III provides several examples of other recent securities regulations controver-
sies in addition to SOX that implicate the questions of how to evaluate securities
regulations and how CBA should fit into such evaluations. Part IV analyzes whether
the SEC and other U.S. financial regulators currently engage in some type of CBA,
and provides background about utilizing CBA as the metric for evaluating financial
policy. Part V analyzes whether the SEC is required by the language of its organiz-
ing statutes to engage only in CBA, concluding that there is considerable textual
ambiguity over this question and a lack of guidance about how to balance multiple
and possibly conflicting objectives in evaluating SEC rules and regulations. Part VI
illustrates affective and subjective well-being impacts for various categories of se-
curities regulations. A conclusion summarizes this Article.
II. AFFECT, HAPPINESS, & TRUST
A. Affective Impacts
This Article utilizes the phrase "affective impacts" in a general sense to refer to not
only affect, but also emotions, feelings, and moods. A widely accepted "circumplex"
model of affect proposes that affective concepts can be organized according to a
circular structure, in a two-dimensional plane with the horizontal axis depicting
valence ranging from distress to pleasant, and the vertical axis indicating the degree
of arousal ranging from low to high." For example, happiness can involve high
arousal as with Western concepts of elation and excitement, but happiness can also
involve low arousal, as with Eastern ideas of calmness and serenity. Examples of
positive affect include awe,' 6 exuberance, 7 gratitude, 8 and happiness; 9 negative af-
fect includes envy,2" guilt,2' regret,22 shame,23 and stress.24
15. See Jonathan Posner et al., The Circumplex Model of Affect: An Integrative Approach to Affective Neuros-
cience, Cognitive Development, and Psychopathology, 17 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 715 (2005). See generally
James A. Russell, A Circumplex Model of Affect, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1161 (1980).
16. See Dacher Keltner & Jonathan Haidt, Approaching Awe, a Moral, Spiritual, and Aesthetic Emotion, 17
COGNITION & EMOTION 297 (2003).
17. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities Markets, in THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 501, 520-23 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005).
18. See generally THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE (Robert A. Emmons & Michael E. McCullough eds.,
2004).
19. See, e.g., JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS: FINDING MODERN TRUTH IN ANCIENT WIS-
DOM (2006).
20. See, e.g., Vai-Lam Mui, The Economics of Envy, 26 J. EcON. BEHAV. & ORG. 311 (1995).
21. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt, and Securities Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1059 (2003).
22. See, e.g., Chien-Huang Lin et al., Multiple Reference Points in Investor Regret, 27 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 781
(2006).
23. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, A Psychology of Emotional Legal Decision Making:
Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and Practice, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1045 (2006) (reviewing MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004)).
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It might seem that of all categories of regulation, securities law is an area in
which regulators do not have to analyze affective considerations because there al-
ready exists a natural metric and yardstick for evaluating outcomes, namely aggre-
gate levels of financial and economic variables, such as consumption, income,
investment, liquidity, prices, trading volume, and wealth. In addition, many people
believe that equilibrium prices of competitive stock markets already reflect all rele-
vant fundamental information for accurately pricing stocks and only that informa-
tion." But, there is much empirical data suggesting that investor moods alter levels
of such traditional economic and financial variables as corporate finance,26 includ-
ing corporate investment, initial public offerings,27 mergers and acquisitions, indi-
vidual debt, market liquidity, and securities demand. In other words, "[s]tock
[market] prices reflect both (fundamental) value and sentiment."28 Seventy years
24. See generally J. DOUGLAS BREMNER, DOES STRESS DAMAGE THE BRAIN?: UNDERSTANDING TRAUMA-
RELATED DISORDERS FROM A MIND-BODY PERSPECTIVE (2002); BRUCE S. McEWEN, THE END OF STRESS AS WE
KNOW IT (2002); RICHARD O'CONNOR, UNDOING PERPETUAL STRESS: THE MISSING CONNECTION BETWEEN
DEPRESSION, ANXIETY, AND 21ST CENTURY ILLNESS (2005); ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, WHY ZEBRAS DON'T GET
ULCERS (3d ed. 2004); HANS SELYE, THE STRESS OF LIFE (rev. ed. 1984); GENE WALLENSTEIN, MIND, STRESS, &
EMOTIONS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF MOOD (2003); ALEX J. ZAUTRA, EMOTIONS, STRESS, AND HEALTH (2003).
25. See, e.g., RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE AND IN-
VESTMENT 136-84 (1993).
26. See HERSH SHEFRIN, BEHAVIORAL CORPORATE FINANCE: DECISIONS THAT CREATE VALUE (2007).
27. JOHN R. NOFSINGER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 86-96 (2d ed. 2005); John R. Nofsinger, Social
Mood and Financial Economics, 6 J. BEHAV. FIN. 144, 147-49, 152-55, 157-58 (2005). See generally Lucy F.
Ackert et al., Emotion and Financial Markets, FED. REs. BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., Second Q. 2003, at 33;
Kevin Au et al., Mood in Foreign Exchange Trading: Cognitive Processes and Performance, 91 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 322 (2003); Editorial Commentary, The Influence of Affect on Investor Decision-
Making, 5 J. BEHAV. FIN. 70 (2004); Frank Fehle et al., Can Companies Influence Investor Behaviour Through
Advertising? Super Bowl Commercials and Stock Returns, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 625 (2005) (finding significant
abnormal stock returns for companies that advertise consistent with mood and attention effects); Melissa L.
Finucane, Mad Cows, Mad Corn, & Mad Money: Applying What We Know About the Perceived Risk of Technolo-
gies to the Perceived Risk of Securities, 3 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. MKTS. 236 (2002); Baruch Fischhoff et al., Investing
in Frankenfirms: Predicting Socially Unacceptable Risks, 2 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. MKTS. 100 (2001); Brian M. Lucey
& Michael Dowling, The Role of Feelings in Investor Decision-Making, 19 J. ECON. SURVEYS 211 (2005); Donald
G. MacGregor et al., Imagery, Affect, and Financial Judgment, 1 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. MKTS. 104 (2000); Ulrike
Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. FIN. 2661 (2005) (finding
that overconfident CEOs engage in excessive corporate investment when they have abundant internal funds,
but limit corporate investment when they require external financing); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate,
Does Overconfidence Affect Corporate Investment? CEO Overconfidence Measures Revisited, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT.
649 (2005) (presenting supplementary evidence about how CEO portrayals in popular financial press are re-
lated to overconfident investment decisions); Rajnish Mehra & Raaj Sah, Mood Fluctuations, Projection Bias,
and Volatility of Equity Prices, 26 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 869 (2002); Richard L. Peterson, "Buy on the
Rumor:" Anticipatory Affect and Investor Behavior, 3 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. MKTS. 218 (2002); Richard I. Rosen,
Merger Momentum and Investor Sentiment: The Stock Market Reaction to Merger Announcements, 79 J. Bus. 987
(2006); Glenn Boyle et al., Emotion, Fear and Superstition in the New Zealand Stockmarket (Feb. 18, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=388581) (analyzing
New Zealand stock market reaction to five economically-neutral events that psychological research indicates
have varying degrees of influence on people's emotions and moods).
28. Kenneth L. Fisher & Meir Statman, Sentiment, Value, and Market-Timing, J. INVESTING, Fall 2004, at
10.
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ago, a famous macroeconomist John Maynard Keynes utilized the phrase "animal
spirits" to describe investor optimism or pessimism when he stated that:
Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability
due to the characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our posi-
tive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than on a mathematical
expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our
decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn
out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits-of
a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a
weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative
probabilities.29
Noted economist John Kenneth Galbraith believed that there is not much that
securities regulators can do about financial euphoria.3" In contrast, several legal
scholars have proposed that securities regulators can and should regulate financial
market euphoria.3'
Recent evidence suggests that relationships between affective considerations and
financial economic variables not only exist, but also run in both directions. There is
a growing body of intriguing empirical data that analyzes whether and to what
extent local astronomical and meteorological conditions are correlated with market
index returns on international financial exchanges. 2 There is medical and psycho-
29. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 161 (1936).
30. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, A SHORT HISTORY OF FINANCIAL EUPHORIA 108 (Viking Penguin 1993)
(1990).
31. See generally Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, With A Tulip, In the South Seas: Gambling and the Regula-
tion of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225 (2001); Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Role of Law in
Managing Market Moods: The Whole Story of Jason, Who Bought High, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 111 (2000) (book
review); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securi-
ties Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135 (2002).
32. See Melanie Cao & Jason Wei, An Expanded Study on the Stock Market Temperature Anomaly, 22 RES.
FIN. 73 (2005) (expanding on and confirming their previous research to include nineteen additional financial
markets); Melanie Cao & Jason Wei, Stock Market Returns: A Note on Temperature Anomaly, 29 J. BANKING &
FIN. 1559 (2005) (finding that for eight international stock markets, returns are statistically significantly and
negatively correlated with temperature); Ilia D. Dichev & Troy D. Janes, Lunar Cycle Effects in Stock Returns, J.
PRIVATE EQUITY, Fall 2003, at 8 (finding that returns are significantly higher, on the magnitude of 5% to 10%
on an annualized basis, around new moon dates as compared to full moon dates for all major U.S. stock
indices over their entire available history); Michael Dowling & Brian M. Lucey, Weather, Biorhythms and Stock
Returns: Some Preliminary Irish Evidence, 14 INT'L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 337 (2005) (examining relationship
between eight proxy variables for investor mood, based on weather, biorhythms, and beliefs, and daily Irish
stock returns from 1988 to 2001, and finding that some variables proposed in recent literature, rain and time
changes around daylight savings have minor, but significant influences); William N. Goetzmann & Ning Zhu,
Rain or Shine: Where is the Weather Effect?, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 559 (2005) (finding and interpreting evidence
that behavior of market-makers, rather than individual investors, may be responsible for observed relationship
between stock market returns and weather); David Hirshleifer & Tyler Shumway, Good Day Sunshine: Stock
Returns and the Weather, 58 1. FIN. 1009 (2003) (finding that morning sunshine at a country's leading stock
exchange is strongly, positively correlated with stock market index returns that day at twenty-six stock ex-
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logical evidence that weather affects people's moods and behavior.33 There is also
field evidence that weather affects reviewers' judgments and decisions about college
applicants.34 Conversely, it is intuitive that financial economic variables impact
people's affect, emotions, moods, and subjective well-being.3" For example, empiri-
cal research finds that consumer personal debt can be very stressful. One study
finds that heads of households with greater outstanding non-mortgage credit debt
changes internationally from 1982-97); Mark J. Kamstra et at., Losing Sleep at the Market: The Daylight Saving
Anomaly, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1005 (2000) (showing that so-called weekend effect in terms of lower-than-
expected Friday-to-Monday stock market returns is particularly pronounced for two weekends involving
daylight-savings clock changes); Mark J. Kamstra et al., Losing Sleep at the Market: The Daylight Saving Anom-
aly: Reply, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1257 (2002) (revisiting the issue of whether daylight-saving-time changes impact
financial markets and concluding that evidence indicates they do); Mark J. Kamstra et al., Winter Blues: A SAD
Stock Market Cycle, 93 AM. EcoN. REv. 324 (2003); Edward M. Saunders, Jr., Stock Prices and Wall Street
Weather, 83 AM. EcON. REV. 1337 (1993) (providing the first study to empirically examine the relationship
between the amount of sunshine and stock market returns, finding that less cloud cover in New York City is
associated with increased returns for major stock market indices of exchanges based in New York City); Kathy
Yuan et al., Are Investors Moonstruck? Lunar Phases and Stock Returns, 13 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 1 (2006) (providing
evidence for a global sample of forty-eight countries that stock returns are lower by 3% to 5% per annum on
days around a full moon than on days around a new moon); Anna Krivelyova & Cesare Robotti, Playing the
Field: Geomagnetic Storms and the Stock Market (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2003-5b,
2003) (finding empirical evidence that unusually high levels of geomagnetic storm activity have a statistically
and economically significant negative impact on the next week's returns for all U.S. stock market indices);
Piman Limpaphayom et al., Gloom and Doom? Local Weather and Futures Trading (2005) (unpublished man-
uscript) (providing direct evidence that local weather affects investor behavior by finding that effective bid-ask
spreads increase on windy days and that sky cover and wind are positively related to futures floor traders'
incomes and market timing abilities). But see Walter Krdimer & Ralf Runde, Stocks and the Weather. An Exercise
in Data Mining or yet Another Capital Market Anomaly?, 22 EMPIRICAL ECON. 637 (1997) (utilizing German
data in an attempt to replicate findings that stock prices are systematically affected by local weather, and
finding that no systematic relationship seems to exist); Reinhold P. Lamb et al., Don't Lose Sleep on It: A Re-
Examination of the Daylight Savings Time Anomaly, 14 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 443 (2004) (finding that neither
consistency nor magnitude and statistical significance of a daylight savings stock market anomaly survives
serious scrutiny); Tim Loughran & Paul Schultz, Weather, Stock Returns, and the Impact of Localized Trading
Behavior, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 343, 345, 355-62 (2004) (finding little evidence that cloudy
weather in a company's headquarters affects its stock returns); Angel Pardo & Enric Valor, Spanish Stock Re-
turns: Where is the Weather Effect?, 9 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 117 (2003) (finding no evidence indicating that sunshine
hours and humidity levels influence Spanish stock market prices under both an open outcry trading system or
computerized and decentralized trading system); J. Michael Pinegar, Losing Sleep at the Market: Comment, 92
AM. ECON. REV. 1251 (2002) (reporting daylight savings stock market anomaly is not robust); Mark A. Trom-
bley, Stock Prices and Wall Street Weather: Additional Evidence, 36 Q.J. Bus. & ECON. 11 (1997) (presenting
evidence indicating that the relationship between stock returns and Wall Street weather is neither clear nor
strong); Ekrem Tufan & Bahattin Hamarat, Do Cloudy Days Affect Stock Exchange Returns: Evidence from the
Istanbul Stock Exchange, 2 J. NAVAL SCI. & ENGINEERING 117 (2004) (finding that cloudy days neither cause nor
are related to the Istanbul Stock Exchange 100 index returns).
33. See, e.g., Matthew C. Keller et al., A Warm Heart and a Clear Head: The Contingent Effects of Weather on
Mood and Cognition, 16 PSYcHOi. Sci. 724 (2005) (reviewing existing psychological studies that link mood to
weather, and providing new experimental evidence that pleasant weather in the form of higher temperature or
barometric pressure is related to higher mood, better memory, and broadened cognitive style during spring as
time spent outside increased).
34. Uri Simonsohn, Clouds Make Nerds Look Good: Field Evidence of the Impact of Incidental Factors on
Decision Making, 20 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 143 (2006) (analyzing a data set of actual college admission
decisions for 682 college applications and finding that applicants' academic attributes are more heavily
weighted on cloudier days, and their non-academic attributes are more heavily weighted on sunnier days).
35. See ROBERT E. LANE, THE Loss OF HAPPINESS IN MARKET DEMOCRACIES 59-76 (2000).
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balances are significantly more likely to report higher levels of psychological dis-
tress.36 Another study finds that credit card behavior is associated with scores on
the Frontal Lobe Personality Scale, which is a measure of personality and behav-
ioral traits associated with frontal cortex dysfunction. 7 Finally, psychological re-
search finds that while materialistic financial attitudes can have negative affective
consequences," non-materialistic financial attitudes positively correlate with finan-
cial knowledge and subjective well-being.39 Such emotions as stress also affect and
are affected by our social relationships." In addition, there is evidence that negative
emotions hurt our longevity, mental health, mortality, and physical health,4' while
positive emotions improve them.42
Affective impacts of regulations include not only changes in various types of
affect in their own right, but also effects of affect on economic and financial vari-
36. See Sarah Brown et al., Debt and Distress: Evaluating the Psychological Cost of Credit, 26 1. EcON.
PSYCHOL. 642 (2005).
37. Marcello Spinella et al., Predicting Credit Card Behavior: A Study in Neuroeconomics, 100 PERPETUAL &
MOTOR SKILLS 777 (2005).
38. See Tim Kasser & Richard M. Ryan, A Dark Side of the American Dream: Correlates of Financial Success
as A Central Life Aspiration, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 410 (1993); Tim Kasser & Richard M. Ryan,
Further Examining the American Dream: Differential Correlates of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goals, 22 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 280 (1996); Carol Nickerson et al., Zeroing in on the Dark Side of the American Dream:
A Closer Look at the Negative Consequences of the Goal for Financial Success, 14 PSYCHOL. Sci. 531 (2003). See
generally TIM KASSER, THE HIGH PRICE OF MATERIALISM (2002).
39. Stephanie M. Bryant et al., Financial Attitudes: Implications for Personal Financial Planning Services
(PFPSs) and Financial Literacy (Apr. 10, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=896101).
40. See EMOTION, SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS, AND HEALTH 58 (Carol D. Ryff& Burton H. Singer eds., 2001).
41. See Pim Cuijpers & Filip Smit, Excess Mortality in Depression: A Meta-Analysis of Community Studies,
72 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 227 (2002) (examining twenty-five studies with 106,628 adult subjects, of whom
6,416 were depressed with follow-up periods of two to sixteen years and concluding that there is an increased
risk of mortality for not only major clinical depression, but also in subclinical forms of depression); Dorothy
D. Dunlop et al., Incidence of Disability Among Preretirement Adults: The Impact of Depression, 95 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 2003 (2005) (finding that odds of activities of daily living disability were 4.3 times greater for de-
pressed adults than their non-depressed peers); Sherita Hill Golden et al., Depressive Symptoms and the Risk of
Type 2 Diabetes: The Atherosclerosis Risk in Communities Study, 27 DIABETES CARE 429 (2004) (finding that
depressive symptoms predicted incident type 2 diabetes in a biracial cohort study of 11,615 initially non-
diabetic adults aged forty-eight to sixty-seven years, who were subsequently followed for six years); Harry
Hemingway & Michael Marmot, Evidence Based Cardiology; Psychosocial Factors in the Aetiology and Prognosis
of Coronary Heart Disease: Systematic Review of Prospective Cohort Studies, 318 BRIT. MED. J. 1460 (1999)
(reviewing epidemiological literature and finding that anxiety and depression are associated with increased risk
of coronary disease). See generally MICHAEL G. MARMOT, THE STATUS SYNDROME: HOW SOCIAL STANDING
AFFECTS OUR HEALTH AND LONGEVITY (2004).
42. See Sheldon Cohen & Sarah D. Pressman, Positive Affect and Health, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
PSYCHOL. SCI. 122 (2006) (highlighting consistent patterns of research associating physical health with trait
positive affect); Sarah D. Pressman & Sheldon Cohen, Does Positive Affect Influence Health?, 131 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 925 (2005) (providing a comprehensive review of consistent patterns in existing literature associating
physical health to positive affect); Andrew Steptoe et al., Positive Affect and Health-Related Neuroendocrine,
Cardiovascular, and Inflammatory Processes, 102 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCi. 6508 (2005) (showing that positive
affect in middle-aged men and women is associated with reduced neuroendocrine, inflammatory, and cardio-
vascular activity); Nicholas Bakalar, Reactions: Go On, Laugh Your Heart Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at F6
(reporting on a study Michael Miller and others presented at the American College of Cardiology demonstrat-
ing that laughter is linked to the healthy functioning of blood vessels).
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ables. For example, rules prohibiting insider trading, backdating options issued to
executives, or spring loading, the practice of companies granting executives stock
options just before announcing good news,43 may have not only affective impacts,
such as increased confidence in stock markets on the part of investors and the non-
investing public and greater trust in corporate America, but also monetary costs
and benefits, including possibly increased stock price informational efficiency.
Thus, there are two aspects of affective impacts. First, there are changes in affect,
which are internal experiences intrinsic to people, in contrast with financial income
and monetary wealth, which are variables that are or can easily become publicly or
externally observable and verifiable to others. Investors are motivated by not only
financial wealth considerations, but also such expressive concerns as equality, eq-
uity, fairness, justice, patriotism, status, and social responsibility."
Second, changes in affect have impacts upon both observable financial behav-
ior,45 and measurable financial outcomes.46 For example, experimental research
documented how disgust and sadness from unrelated contexts alter people's buying
and selling behavior.47 Thus, changes in positive and negative forms of affect have
both direct consequences in terms of people's subjective well-being and indirect
consequences for their financial behavior and our economy.
Financial economists and the popular press have proposed numerous measures
of investor confidence, mood, or sentiment, some based upon survey data, and
others based upon financial market statistics, such as Barron's Confidence Index,4"
the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index or Investor Fear Gauge,49 the
Equity Market Sentiment Index, ° Issuance Percentage,5 Net Cash Flow into Mu-
43. Kara Scannell et al., Can Companies Issue Options, Then Good News?, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2006, at Al
(reporting on controversy over spring loading).
44. Meir Statman, What Do Investors Want?, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., 2004, at 153, 154-59.
45. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. MAUBOUSSIN, MORE THAN You KNOW: FINDING FINANCIAL WISDOM IN UNCON-
VENTIONAL PLACES 87-88, 246-48 (2008); Donald G. MacGregor, Imagery and Financial Judgment, 3 J.
PSYCHOL. & FIN. MKTS. 15 (2002).
46. See, e.g., Baba Shiv et al., Investment Behavior and the Negative Side of Emotion, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 435
(2005) (providing the first study finding that people who have brain lesions in regions associated with emo-
tional processing made riskier investment decisions and earned higher profits than normal subjects).
47. Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Heart Strings and Purse Strings: Carryover Effects of Emotions on Economic
Decisions, 15 PSYCHOL. SCi. 337 (2004).
48. See generally Malek Lashgari, The Role of TED Spread and Confidence Index in Explaining the Behavior
of Stock Prices, 18 AM. Bus. REV. 9 (2000).
49. George J. Jiang & Yisong S. Tian, Gauging the "Investor Fear Gauge": Implementation Problems in the
CBOE's New Volatility Index and a Simple Solution, J. DERIVATIVES (forthcoming 2008); Robert E. Whalley, The
Investor Fear Gauge, 26 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 12 (2000); Matthew Moran, Taking a Ride on the Volatile Side,
INDEX UNIVERSE, Sept. 30, 2004, http://www.indexuniverse.com/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article
&Itemid=34&issue=19&id=1806; see also Chicago Board Options Exchange-Micro Site, http://www.cboe.com/
micro/vix/faq.aspx (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
50. Arindam Bandopadhyaya & Anne Leah Jones, Measuring Investor Sentiment in Equity Markets, 7 J.
ASSET MGMT. 208 (2006).
51. See generally Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Investor Sentiment and the Cross-Section of Stock Re-
turns, 61 J. FIN. 1645 (2006).
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tual Funds, 2 the Put-Call Ratio, 3 and the Risk Appetite Index. 4 A recent empirical
study found that a simple measure of media pessimism constructed from the Wall
Street Journal's daily "Abreast of the Market" column predicts low stock market
prices.55 Analysis of investor sentiment must differentiate among different catego-
ries of investors, however, because investor sentiment differs across investors.5 "
Although how to accurately and most usefully measure the mood and sentiment
of consumers and investors remain open questions, 7 there are several measures of
consumer and investor confidence and optimism including the ABC News/Money
Magazine Consumer Comfort Index; UBS/Gallup Index of Investor Optimism;59
the Conference Board's Consumer Confidence Index;s° and the University of Mich-
igan, Institute for Social Research, Survey Research Center Index of Investor Senti-
ment, Investor Current Conditions Index, Index of Investor Expectations, Index of
Consumer Sentiment, Index of Consumer Confidence, and Index of Consumer Ex-
pectations." A number of studies investigate the relationship between various mea-
sures of consumer confidence or investor sentiment and real economic variables or
stock market performance.62 Thus, although affective variables might seem to be
more difficult to measure and quantify than traditional financial economic vari-
ables, it already has been done in various ways, making analysis of affective impacts
quite feasible.
52. See generally Maury R. Randall et al., Mutual Fund Cash Flows and Stock Market Performance, 12 J.
INVESTING 78 (2003).
53. See generally id.
54. See generally Manmohan S. Kumar & Avinash Persaud, Pure Contagion and Investors' Shifting Risk
Appetite: Analytical Issues and Empirical Evidence, 5 INT'L FIN. 401 (2002).
55. See generally Paul C. Tetlock, Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of the Media in the Stock
Market, 62 J. FIN. 1139 (2007).
56. See Kenneth L. Fisher & Meir Statman, Investor Sentiment and Stock Returns, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar./
Apr. 2000, at 16.
57. See generally Jeff Dominitz & Charles F. Manski, How Should We Measure Consumer Confidence?, I.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 2004, at 51.
58. ABC Consumer Comfort Index-United States, http://www.fxwords.comla/abc-consumer-comfort-
index-united-states.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
59. See Dennis Jacobe & David W. Moore, Cutting Through the Noise: The UBS Index of Investor Optimism,
PUB. PERSP., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 35; see also UBS Index of Investor Optimism, http://www.ubs.com/l/e/about/
research/indexofinvestoroptimism.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
60. The Conference Board, Consumer Confidence Index, http://www.conference-board.org/ (last visited
Feb. 10, 2008).
61. University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers, http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu (last visited Feb. 10,
2008).
62. Gregory W. Brown & Michael T. Cliff, Investor Sentiment and the Near-Term Stock Market, II J. EM-
PIRICAL FIN. 1 (2004); Kenneth L. Fisher & Meir Statman, Blowing Bubbles, 3 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. MKTs. 53
(2002); Kenneth L. Fisher & Meir Statman, Consumer Confidence and Stock Returns, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Fall
2003, at 115; Kenneth L. Fisher & Meir Statman, Market Timing in Regressions and Reality, 29 J. FIN. REs. 293
(2006); W. los Jansen & Niek J. Nahuis, The Stock Market and Consumer Confidence: European Evidence, 79
ECON. LETTERS 89 (2003); Alok Kumar & Charles M.C. Lee, Retail Investor Sentiment and Return Comovements,
61 J. FIN. 2451 (2006); Sydney C. Ludvigson, Consumer Confidence and Consumer Spending, I. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 2004, at 29; Lily Qiu & vo Welch, Investor Sentiment Measures (July 28, 2006) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
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Analysis of affective impacts must also acknowledge that it can be difficult classi-
fying particular affects as benefits or costs, and hard to determine how to weigh
affective impacts against each other and other considerations. So, for example, are
anxiety and fear costs that should weigh in favor of government secrecy? Is opti-
mism truly beneficial if such optimism could lead easily to irrational exuberance?
Should financial regulators design policy so that people have feelings of autonomy,
self-determination, and influence without actually giving them any actual auton-
omy, self-determination or influence? Should financial regulators convince the
apocryphal widows and orphans that securities investing is a level playing field
when that is not so? Should financial regulators mandate that investing be left only
to experts that no longer exhibit as much affective response to stock market news as
neophytes?
B. Happiness
Of all the various types of affect, happiness enjoys a privileged status in that most
people claim to want happiness above all else in their lives, and most parents claim
to want happiness for their children more than anything else. People also wish for
happiness upon their friends and loved ones. Some people also experience joy or
schadenfreude from and wish for unhappiness upon those whom they harbor ill-
will or bad feelings. So, happiness occupies a unique position of being not only a
type of affect, but also the prototypical concept of at least positive affect. Indeed,
the noted Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated near the culmi-
nation of an influential and seminal essay that, "we all want happiness."63
The United States Declaration of Independence held it self-evident that among
our inalienable rights is "the pursuit of happiness."64 But, what is happiness?65 Can
people achieve happiness and maintain it?66 Can law and public policy promote
happiness?67 Is happiness correlated with health?68 Is happiness related to prefer-
ences that people seem to manifest or appear to reveal in their observed choices?69
63. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., The Path of the Law, Remarks at the
Dedication of the new hall of the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459
(1897).
64. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
65. Richard A. Easterlin, Explaining Happiness, 100 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 11, 176 (2003).
66. Sonja Lyubomirsky et al., Pursuing Happiness: The Architecture of Sustainable Change, 9 REV. GEN.
PSYCHOL. 111 (2005).
67. See Peter H. Huang & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Positive Law and Policy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POSITIVE
PSYCHOLOGY (Shane J. Lopez ed., forthcoming 2008); Peter H. Huang & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Positive Institu-
tions, Law, and Policy, in HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (Shane J. Lopez ed., 2d ed. forthcoming 2008);
Mirko Bagaric & James McConvill, Goodbye Justice, Hello Happiness: Welcoming Positive Psychology to the Law,
10 DEAKIN L. REV. 1 (2005); Peter H. Huang, Authentic Happiness, Self-Knowledge, and Legal Policy, 9 MINN. J.
L. ScI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2008).
68. See generally Steptoe et al., supra note 42.
69. P.A. Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behavior, 5 ECONOMICA 61 (1938).
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Many individuals, philosophies, and societies have attempted to answer these ques-
tions over the history of humanity.7
Different cultural traditions manifest different attitudes towards these timeless
questions." Even within a country, people can differ in their conceptions of happi-
ness across demographic classifications of age, ethnicity, and gender. People's views
about happiness also can vary depending on their educational background, in-
come, job, marital status, and socio-economic status. Only recently has empirical
research begun to analyze how and which exogenous and endogenous variables
affect happiness.7 2 Also recently, interdisciplinary empirical studies have linked cer-
tain types of happiness to such biological and physiological correlates as cardiovas-
cular measures, immune function, longevity, neural circuitry,73 neuroendocrine
markers, and sleep efficiency. This research lays foundations for an intriguing pos-
sibility, namely that of a science of happiness;74 and its policy applications." Thus
far, however, there have been limited applications of insights from a science of
happiness to corporate law,76 lawyers' quality of life,77 and tax law.7"
70. DANIEL NETTLE, HAPPINESS: THE SCIENCE BEHIND YOUR SMILE, 45-48 (2005) (discussing alternative
historical views and hypotheses about happiness).
71. See CULTURE AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING (Ed Diener & Eunkook M. Suh eds., 2000).
72. See, e.g., HAIDT, supra note 19.
73. See Heather L. Urry et al., Making a Life Worth Living: Neural Correlates of Well-Being, 15 PSYCHOL.
ScI. 367 (2004).
74. See generally THE SCIENCE OF SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING (Michael Eid & Randy ]. Larsen eds., 2008);
THE SCIENCE OF WELL-BEING (Felicia A. Huppert et al. eds., 2005); WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HE-
DONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
75. See BRUNO S. FREY, HAPPINESS: A REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS (2008) (developing policy implications
of happiness research); ANTHONY JOHN PATRICK KENNY & CHARLES KENNY, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT
OF UTILITY: HAPPINESS IN PHILOSOPHICAL AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT 189-207 (2006) (exploring policies for
happiness); RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE (2005) (arguing for specific policy
implications of happiness research for public economics); Richard Layard, Happiness and Public Policy A Chal-
lenge to the Profession, 116 ECON. J. C24 (2006) (same).
76. See JAMES MCCONVILL, SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION AND THE CORPORATION: A FRESH INTER-DISCI-
PLINARY APPROACH IN HAPPINESS (2006); JAMES MCCONVILL, THE FALSE PROMISE OF PAY FOR PERFORMANCE:
EMBRACING A POSITIVE MODEL OF THE COMPANY EXECUTIVE (2005); James A. McConvill, Positive Corporate
Governance, 6 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 51 (2006); James A. McConvill, The Separation of Ownership and Control Under
A Happiness-Based Theory of the Corporation, 26 COMP. LAW. 35 (2005); James McConvill, Executive Compensa-
tion and Corporate Governance: Rising Above the "Pay-for-Performance" Principle, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 413 (2006);
James McConvill, Piercing the 'Decision-Making Sphere': Happiness as the Key to 'Real' Shareholder Participa-
tion, 16 EUR. Bus. L. REV. 831 (2005); James McConvill, Shareholder Empowerment as an End in Itself. A New
Perspective on Allocation of Power in the Modern Corporation, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1013 (2007). But see HARRY
G. HUTCHISON & R. SEAN ALLEY, SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT AS AN END IN ITSELF IN THE MIRROR OF
AUTHORITY (forthcoming 2008); Harry G. Hutchison & R. Sean Alley, Against Shareholder Participation: A
Treatment for McConvill's Psychonomicosis, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 41 (2007) (critiquing McConvill's
argument); Posting of Gordon Smith to Conglomerate Blog, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/03/the-
happiness -o.html#c15744737 (Mar. 31, 2006, 21:20 EST) (raising three other important questions about Mc-
Convill's argument); ProfessorBainbridge.com Blog, http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2006/03/shareholder
-par.html (Mar. 31, 2006, 22:13 EST) (arguing that employees have a stronger case for participation in corpo-
rate governance and that many employees prefer hierarchy).
77. Peter H. Huang & Rick Swedloff, Lawyer Happiness and Unhappiness in Law Firm Settings, 58 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 335 (2008); Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Why Lawyers are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33
(2001); Symposium, Perspectives on Lawyer Happiness, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. (2008).
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Academic research about happiness is a recent growth industry among econo-
mists, 9 historians,"° philosophers,"' and psychologists.' 2 A veritable plethora of
trade books provide summaries of this already sizeable, but still rapidly growing
literature.8 3 Several national magazines and newspapers featured happiness research
as their cover story. 4 A national morning news program included a segment about
what makes people happy."5 Many of these and other instances of popular media
coverage about happiness involved prominent depictions of a familiar yellow
smiley-face icon that Massachusetts graphic artist Harvey Bell created in 1964 for a
life insurance company that paid him $45 for it (but, neither he nor the insurance
company copyrighted it, thus explaining in part its popularity since then). 6
78. See generally Mirko Bagaric & James A. McConvill, Stop Taxing Happiness: A New Perspective on Pro-
gressive Taxation, 2 PITT. TAX REV. 1 (2005); Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L.
REV. 1363 (2004); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Educating Ourselves Towards a Progressive (and Happier) Tax: A
Commentary on Griffith's Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1399 (2004); Diane M. Ring,
Why Happiness?: A Commentary on Griffith's Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1413 (2004).
79. See JOHN MALCOLM DOWLING & YAP CHIN-FANG, MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN BEHAVIORAL ECoNOM-
ICS: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON CHOICE AND DECISION MAKING 181-250 (2007); ROBERT H. FRANK,
FALLING BEHIND: How RISING INEQUALITY HARMS THE MIDDLE CLASS (2007); ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY
FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS (1999); BRUNO S. FREY & ALOIS STUTZER, HAPPI-
NESS & ECONOMICS (2002); Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Re-
search?, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 402 (2002); see also RICHARD A. EASTERLIN, HAPPINESS IN ECONOMICS (2002);
ECONOMICS & HAPPINESS: FRAMING THE ANALYSIS (Luigino Bruni & Pier Luigi Porta eds., 2005); HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF HAPPINESS (Luigino Bruni & Pier Luigi Porta eds., 2007).
80. See, e.g., JENNIFER MICHAEL HECHT, THE HAPPINESS MYTH: WHY WHAT WE THINK Is RIGHT IS
WRONG: A HISTORY OF WHAT REALLY MAKES Us HAPPY (2007); DARRIN M. MCMAHON, HAPPINESS: A His-
TORY (2006).
81. See generally ROBERT ALMEDER, HUMAN HAPPINESS AND MORALITY: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO ETH-
ICS (2000); RICHARD KRAUT, WHAT Is GooD AND WHY: THE ETHICS OF WELL-BEING (2007); L.W. SUMNER,
WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS (1996).
82. See, e.g., JOHN F. SCHUMAKER, IN SEARCH OF HAPPINESS: UNDERSTANDING AN ENDANGERED STATE OF
MIND 15 (2007).
83. Carol Memmott, Grump Journeys to Find World's Happiest Places, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 2008, at El
(describing ERIC WEINER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF BLISS: ONE GRUMP'S SEARCH FOR THE HAPPIEST PLACES IN
THE WORLD (2007) and other recently published trade books about happiness). See generally DAN BAKER ET
AL., WHAT HAPPY COMPANIES KNOW: HOW THE NEW SCIENCE OF HAPPINESS CAN CHANGE YOUR COMPANY
FOR THE BETTER (2006); TAL BEN-SHAHAR, THE QUESTION OF HAPPINESS: ON FINDING MEANING, PLEASURE,
AND THE ULTIMATE CURRENCY (2002); GREGORY BERNS, SATISFACTION: THE SCIENCE OF FINDING TRUE FUL-
FILLMENT (2005); DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2005); HAIDT, supra note 19; FELICIA A. HuP-
PERT ET AL., THE SCIENCE OF WELL-BEING (2005); DANIEL NETTLE, HAPPINESS: THE SCIENCE BEHIND YOUR
SMILE (2005); MATTHIEU RICARD, HAPPINESS: A GUIDE TO DEVELOPING LIFE'S MOST IMPORTANT SKILL (Jesse
Browner trans., Little, Brown & Co. 2006) (2003); MICHAEL SHERMER, THE MIND OF THE MARKET: COMPAS-
SIONATE APES, COMPETITIVE HUMANS, AND OTHER TALES FROM EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMiCS 139-66 (2008);
MARCI SHIMOFF WITH CAROL KLINE, HAPPY FOR No REASON: 7 STEPS TO BEING HAPPY FROM THE INSIDE OUT
(2008); BERNARD M.S. VAN PRAAG & ADA FERRER-I-CARBONELL, HAPPINESS QUANTIFIED: A SATISFACTION
CALCULUS APPROACH (2d rev. ed. 2007).
84. Geoffrey Cowley, The Science of Happiness, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 16, 2002, http://www.newsweek.com/id/
65673; Dennis McCafferty, The Happiest Guy, USAWEEKEND.COM, Mar. 9, 2003, http://www.usaweekend.com/
03_issues/030309/030309happiestman.htm; see also Holly J. Morris, Happiness Explained, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Aug. 26, 2001; Claudia Wallis, The New Science of Happiness, TIME, Jan. 17, 2005.
85. Today (NBC television broadcast Sept. 1, 2006).
86. CHRISTOPHER PETERSON, A PRIMER IN POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 7 (2006).
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Several economists and psychologists conducting research about happiness re-
cently proposed that countries adopt national well-being accounts, 7 although other
economists have criticized such proposals.88 Psychologist and 2002 Nobel Laureate
in economics Daniel Kahneman and economist Robert Sugden recently proposed
that environmental regulators evaluate policies based upon measures of exper-
ienced utility." Daniel Kahneman and economist Alan Krueger advocated supple-
menting traditional economic objective measures of well-being, such as market-
based variables,9" with various psychological measures of happiness and subjective
well-being.9 As Robert Kennedy eloquently once said:
[G]ross national product does not allow for the health of our children, the
quality of their education or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty
of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public
debate or the integrity of our public officials. It measures neither our wit nor
our courage, neither our wisdom nor our teaching ... it measures everything
in short, except that which makes life worthwhile.92
As economics professor Nancy Folbre stated, "the purpose of gross domestic prod-
uct, after all, is to make lives better now and for generations to come."93
Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan recently stated in an
interview on Comedy Central's The Daily Show that measuring fear and euphoria
can revolutionalize economic forecasting. 4 On the other hand, there are concerns
about the reliability of subjective well-being measures,9" roles for happiness in pub-
lic policies,96 implications for policy,97 what exactly self-reports of happiness mea-
87. See Ed Diener, Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a Proposal for a National Index, 55
AM. PSYCHOL. 34 (2000); Daniel Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger, Developments in the Measurement of Subjective
Well-Being, J. EcoN. PERSP., Winter 2006, at 3; Daniel Kahneman et al., Toward National Well-Being Accounts,
94 AM. ECON. REV. 429 (2003).
88. See, e.g., D.P. Doessel, The Rise of Studying Happiness, But What of the Shadow of Unhappiness from
Mental Illness?, 25 PROMETHEUS 435 (2007); Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Maximizing Happiness?, I GERMAN
ECON. REV. 145 (2000).
89. Daniel Kahneman & Robert Sugden, Experienced Utility as a Standard of Policy Evaluation, 32 ENVTL. &
RESOURCE ECON. 161 (2005).
90. Happiness & The Economy, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZgvheHMaPtl (last visited Feb. 10,
2008).
91. Well-Being Defined, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oGCKHX4Lr9od (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
92. Senator Robert F. Kennedy, Address at the University of Kansas (Mar. 18, 1968), available at http://
www.jfldibrary.ord/Historical+Resources/ArchivesReferencetesklSpeeches/RFK/
RFKSpeech68Marl8UKansas.htm).
93. NANCY FOLBRE, VALUING CHILDREN: RETHINKING THE ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 1 (2008).
94. The New Economic Indicators, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Otl-FDrWf8 (last visited Feb. 10,
2008).
95. Alan B. Krueger & David A. Schakde, The Reliability of Subjective Well-Being Measures, J. PUB. ECON.
(forthcoming).
96. George Loewenstein & Peter Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and the Role of Decision and Experience Utility
in Public Policy, J. PUB. ECON. (forthcoming).
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sure,9" and use of happiness research to justify government expansion and tax
increases.99
C. Trust
It is quite intuitive to view a flight from U.S. stock markets as due to investors
having lost confidence and trust in U.S. stock markets after the string of infamous
corporate scandals. Investor confidence and trust in corporate securities markets
are fragile public goods.' 0 A trust-based explanation of why investors deserted U.S.
stock markets would imply that restoring, maintaining, and promoting investor
confidence about and trust in our stock markets is crucial to U.S. economic pros-
perity. But, trust does not play any role in the standard finance literature about
investors' optimal portfolio choices and rates of stock market participation. Only
very recently, a financial model demonstrated analytically how people's fears of
being cheated reduce their participation in stock markets.'' Calibrating this model
showed that mistrust in stock markets can explain why many wealthy people in the
United States do not buy stocks, in addition to account for cross-country differ-
ences in stock market participation rates.'0 2
Also recently, a study conducting five experiments "found that incidental emo-
tions significantly influence trust in unrelated settings. Happiness and gratitude-
emotions with positive valence-increase trust, and anger-an emotion with nega-
tive valence-decreases trust."'0 3 A pair of legal scholars also recently proposed a
cognitive theory about optimal trust and explored its policy implications for two
settings: corporate governance and doctor-patient relationships.0 4 Two psycholo-
gists conducted experiments on the World Wide Web and found that CBA can
increase people's trust in decisions that government agencies or companies make.'
Empirical research based upon data from the European Union revealed that institu-
tional trust in law has positive impacts upon people's self-reported subjective well-
being.10 6 Finally, financial economist Michael C. Jensen recently advocated that fi-
97. Wil Wilkinson, In Pursuit of Happiness Research: Is It Reliable? What Does It Imply for Policy?, 590 POL'Y
ANALYSIS 1 (2007).
98. Peter A. Diamond, Behavioral Economics, J. PUB. ECON. (forthcoming).
99. Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Happiness and Public Policy: A Partial Dissent (or, Why a Depart-
ment of Homeland Happiness Would Be a Bad Idea), 22 J.L. & POL. 283 (2006).
100. See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA'S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD
(2006); TAMAR FRANKEL & MARK FAGEN, INTRODUCTION TO TRUST AND HONESTY IN THE REAL WORLD: A
JOINT COURSE FOR LAWYERS, BUSINESS PEOPLE AND REGULATORS (2007).
101. Luigi Guiso et al., Trusting the Stock Market, 7 J. FIN. (forthcoming 2008).
102. Id.
103. Jennifer R. Dunn & Maurice E. Schweitzer, Feeling and Believing: The Influence of Emotion on Trust, 88
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 736, 736 (2005).
104. Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O'Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1717 (2006).
105. Jonathan Baron & Andrea D. Gurmankin, Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Increase Trust in Decision Mak-
ers (Nov. 23, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.sas.upenn.edu/-baron/cba.html).
106. John Hudson, Institutional Trust and Subjective Well-Being Across the EU, 59 KYKLOS 43 (2006).
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nancial theory and practice develop a language for how integrity affects corporate,
market, personal, and policy issues.0 7
There is voluminous behavioral finance literature about investor sentiment. °0
Corporate and securities law scholar Lynn Stout suggests that investor confidence
and trust motivate investing. °9 A number of legal scholars have addressed how to
restore trust in American business."' A recent laboratory study found that trust
harmed by untrustworthy actions can be restored effectively, but that trust harmed
by deception and the same untrustworthy behavior never fully recovers even after
promises, apologies, and consistently trustworthy actions."' Future research should
analyze how such emotions as anxiety and frustration influence trust and its recov-
ery. 12 It is crucial to emphasize that the goal of any financial regulator should not
be to just increase trust per se unboundedly, but rather to foster an optimal equi-
librium degree of trust. This amount of trust should be well-calibrated with actual
trustworthiness on the part of securities and financial professionals.
III. OTHER RECENT SECURITIES LAW CONTROVERSIES
Several other controversial securities regulations also raise these same fundamental
questions about how to appraise securities regulations and if CBA should be part of
appraising securities regulations. A number of contentious recent SEC rules in-
volved regulation of mutual funds. A mutual fund pools money from many inves-
tors to purchase diverse assets, such as bonds, money market securities, and
stocks." 3 Harry M. Markowitz provided a theoretical rationale for mutual funds in
1952 when he pioneered modern portfolio theory,"4 for which he shared the 1990
Alfred Nobel Prize in Economic Science with Merton H. Miller and William F.
Sharpe. Modern portfolio theory formalized a long-standing intuition that diversi-
fication or "not putting all your eggs in one basket" is a reasonable investment
107. Michael C. Jensen, Putting Integrity into Finance Theory and Practice: A Positive Approach 2 (Harvard
Negotiation, Orgs. & Mkts. Research Paper No. 06-06, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract id=876312.
108. See HERSH SHEFRIN, A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO ASSET PRICING 201-19 (2005); see also Sentiment,
http://sentiment.behaviouralfinance.net/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
109. Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 415, 420 (2002).
110. See generally RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (Jay W. Lorsch et al. eds., 2005); RESTORING
TRUST IN AMERICA'S BUSINESS INSTITUTIONS: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW
CENTER, Nov. 6-7, 2003 (Margaret M. Blair & William W. Bratton eds., 2005); ROBERT C. SOLOMON & FER-
NANDO FLORES, BUILDING TRUST IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND LIFE (2001).
111. Maurice E. Schweitzer et al., Promises and Lies: Restoring Violated Trust, 101 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 1, 14-15 (2006).
112. Dunn & Schweitzer, supra note 103, at 746.
113. See, e.g., Mutual Fund Investor's Center: Why Mutual Funds, http://www.mfea.com/GettingStarted/
LearningTopics/Basics/TheBasics.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2008); see also E. PHILIP DAVIS & BENN STEIL, INSTI-
TUTIONAL INVESTORS 16-17 (2001) (defining mutual funds).
114. See generally HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVEST-
MENTS (Cowley Found. for Res. in Econ. at Yale Univ. 1991) (1959); Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J.
FIN. 77 (1952).
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strategy to reduce financial risks."' Investors today face an overwhelming plethora
of retail mutual funds to help them diversify their financial investments.'16 Over
half of U.S. households own shares in mutual funds."7 Americans participate in
stock markets primarily via mutual funds and pension plans."8 The U.S. mutual
fund industry grew from just 73 funds in 1945 to 8,000 funds by 2002."' Mutual
fund shares of 401(k) assets were merely 9% in 1990, but 44% by 2001.12° Similarly,
67% of retirement assets were in equity mutual funds by 2004, compared to 9% in
1990.121 U.S. mutual funds managed assets of approximately $50 billion in 1970.122
American mutual funds now hold more than $7.5 trillion in assets and are continu-
ing to increase significantly in size and importance.'23 Mutual funds offer individu-
als not only investment vehicles, but also advice, education, and
(mis)information. 124 Recent mutual fund scandals led to a number of class action
lawsuits, criminal prosecutions, and proposed regulations.
125
On July 27, 2004, the SEC adopted corporate governance rules that require mu-
tual-fund companies to, among other things, (i) have chairs of their boards who
are independent of their fund's management, and (ii) increase the percentage of
directors on their boards who are independent of their fund's management from a
previously required 50% to 75% (except for three member boards, where two are
required to be independent). 126 On June 21, 2005, the most important court in
federal regulatory law, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, unanimously
remanded to the SEC for consideration of the costs of the above two require-
115. RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 181 (8th ed. 2006) (explaining
Harry Markowitz's pioneering contributions to portfolio diversification); BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM
WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 179-96 (9th ed. 2007)
(describing how modern portfolio theory helps investors reduce financial risks).
116. See, e.g., Mutual Fund Investor's Center, supra note 113.
117. Id.; see also Carol Bertaut & Martha Starr-McCluer, Household Portfolios in the United States, in
HOUSEHOLD PORTFOLIOS 183-98 (Luigi Guiso et al. eds., 2002) (providing data, trends, and evidence about
U.S. household portfolios).
118. See John C. Bogle, Individual Stockholder, R.I.P., WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2005, at A16.
119. INV. Co. INST., MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK (43d ed. 2003).
120. Mutual Funds and the Retirement Market, FUNDAMENTALS (Inv. Co. Inst., Washington, D.C.), July
1998, at 1, 4.
121. Mutual Funds and the U.S Retirement Market in 2004, FUNDAMENTALS (Inv. Co. Inst., Washington,
D.C.), Aug. 2005, at 1, 6.
122. Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Competition and Change in the Mutual Fund Industry, in FINANCIAL
SERVICES: PERSPECTIVES AND CHALLENGES 181 (Samuel L. Hayes ed., 1993).
123. Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber of Commerce v- SEC Mutual Fund "Govern-
ance" Litigation (Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://www.uschamber.com/nclc/news/casealerts/ca050408.htm. See
generally ROBERT C. POZEN, THE MUTUAL FUND BUSINESS (Sandra D. Crane ed., 2d ed. 2002).
124. Kenneth L. Fisher & Meir Statman, Investment Advice from Mutual Fund Companies, J. PORTFOLIO
MGMT., Fall 1997, at 9.
125. Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2004, at 161,
176-81.
126. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378
(Aug. 2, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
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ments,' because "the Commission "fail[ed] adequately to consider the costs im-
posed upon funds by the two challenged conditions."' 8
In spite of this decision, and without providing for any further public notice or
comment, the SEC affirmed its July 2004 rule only eight days later by a narrow 3-2
vote.' 29 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which originally challenged the SEC rule,
also challenged the SEC's affirming its rule.'30 The SEC estimated the costs of com-
pliance per mutual fund would be "extremely small relative to the fund assets for
which fund boards are responsible, and are also small relative to the expected bene-
fits . ".. .  Both dissenting Commissioners, eight Senators, former SEC Commis-
sioner Joseph A. Grundfest, and former SEC Chair Harvey Pitt all made pleas for a
more deliberative approach. " 2
On April 7, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit unanimously
vacated both of the requirements,'" holding that the SEC violated the comment
requirement of part 553(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act because the SEC
"relied on extra-record material critical to its costs estimates without affording an
opportunity for comment to the prejudice of the Chamber ....""' The court,
however, suspended issuance of its mandate for 90 days, giving the SEC an oppor-
tunity to "reopen the record for comment on the costs of implementing the two
conditions.""' On June 13, 2006, the SEC issued a request for additional comments
until August 21, 2006 regarding these rules.'36
127. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
128. Id. at 144.
129. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,985, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,390,
403 (July 7, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270); Michael Schroeder, SEC Adopts Mutual Fund Rule, Risks
New Court Challenge, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2005, at C1. This affirmation also was just one day before former
SEC Chair William Donaldson's resignation took effect.
130. Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Chamber Files Motion to Stay SEC Mutual Fund Rule (July
26, 2005), available at http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2005/tuly/05-126.htm; Press Release, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Files Suit Against New Mutual Fund Rules; Charges SEC Overstepped
Authority in Independent Boards (Sept. 2, 2004), available at http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2004/
september/04-118.htm; Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Vows to Continue Fight;
SEC Mutual Fund Action to be Challenged in Court (June 29, 2005), available at http://www.uschamber.com/
press/releases/2005/iune/05-112.htm.
131. Investment Company Governance, 70 Fed. Reg. at 39,395.
132. Id. at 39,403-09; see also Letter from Senators to the SEC (June 22, 2005), available at http://www.
sec.gov/rules/final/icgletters/senate062205.pdf; Letter from Joseph A. Grundfest, W.A. Franke Professor of Law
and Bus., Stanford Law Sch., to the Chairman and Commissioners of the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (June 23, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/icgletters/agrundfest62305.pdf; Let-
ter from Harvey L. Pitt, former Comm'r of the SEC, to Chairman Donaldson and Comm'rs Glassman,
Goldschmid, Campos and Atkins, Chairman and Comm'rs of the SEC (June 23, 2005), available at http://www.
sec.gov/rules/final/icgletters/hpitt062305.pdf.
133. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 909 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
134. Id. at 908.
135. Id. at 909.
136. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,395, 71 Fed. Reg. 35,366
(June 19, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
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One securities law scholar believed this mutual fund regulation likely would have
unknowable costs, but few knowable benefits."' A recent empirical study found
that strengthened corporate governance controls have no statistically significant
impact on mutual fund outflows. 3 Three additional recent empirical studies found
that when directors and managers of mutual funds personally own shares in those
mutual funds, those mutual funds perform better. " 9 These findings provide sup-
port for SEC rules that require mutual funds to disclose information regarding
mutual fund share ownership by directors, 4 ' and similarly by managers. 4 ' Fur-
thermore, most investors are likely to have no idea if directors of the board for any
particular mutual fund are independent. A survey that asked investors what they
would prefer is likely to find that many people would have a preference for direc-
tors with a lot of skin in the game so as to keep incentives of directors and share-
holders aligned regarding fund performance.
Much of the controversy over these mutual fund governance rules involved pro-
cess concerns about how genuinely and thoroughly the SEC had deliberated over
these mutual fund governance rules. In particular, the SEC decided very quickly to
affirm these rules upon the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit's decision to
remand them to the SEC for consideration of those rules' costs. As distinguished
economist Albert 0. Hirschman eloquently stated, "for a democracy to function
well and to endure, it is essential, so it has been argued, that opinions not be fully
formed in advance of the process of deliberation."'42 Not only substantive out-
comes, but also procedural or process considerations motivate people's behavior,
even when it comes to investment and retirement savings.' 5 Recently, two econo-
mists proposed a notion of procedural utility and provided empirical evidence that
participation rights lead to procedural utility in terms of a feeling of self-determi-
nation and influence; while actual participation and use of participation rights did
137. Larry E. Ribstein, Do the Mutuals Need More Law?, REG., Spring 2004, at 14, 15, available at http://
www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv27n 1/brieflynoted.pdf.
138. Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals 25-27 (N.Y. Univ. Sch.
of Law, Law and Economics Working Paper No. 43, 2006), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/lewp/papers/
43/.
139. Ajay Khorana et al., Portfolio Manager Ownership and Fund Performance, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 179 (2007);
Martijn Cremers et al., Does Skin in the Game Matter? Director Incentives and Governance in the Mutual Fund
Industry 23 (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 06-34, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstractid=686167; Allison L. Evans, Portfolio Manager Ownership and Mutual Fund Performance
(Jan. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=893802).
140. 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 240, 270, 274 (2006).
141. Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers of Registered Management Investment Companies, Securities
Act Release No. 8,458, Exchange Act Release No. 50,227, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,533, 69 Fed.
Reg. 52,788 (Aug. 27, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 249, 270, 274).
142. Albert 0. Hirschman, Having Opinions-One of the Elements of Well-Being?, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 75, 77
(1989).
143. Harris Sondak & Tom R. Tyler, How Does Procedural Justice Shape the Desirability of Markets?, 28 J.
EcON. PSYCHOL. 79, 80, 88 (2007); Tom R. Tyler, Process Utility and Help Seeking: What Do People Want from
Experts?, 27 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 360, 362-72 (2006) (demonstrating empirically that peoples' utilities extend
beyond financial and material outcomes to process, even in settings traditionally framed in economic terms).
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not. 4 Thus, the SEC should analyze and acknowledge not only affective impacts
related to substantive outcomes, but also such affective impacts related to procedu-
ral or process considerations as emotional difficulties that many individuals and
groups of people have in facing and making certain types of tradeoffs, 4 ' which
much of economics and many economists consider without any emotional difficul-
ties.'46 A hypothesis is that people who do not see the world through an economics
lens are likely to experience strong negative emotions to such tradeoffs, while peo-
ple who see the world through an economics lens are likely to feel no emotional
reactions toward such tradeoffs, because such emotions are responses to taboo
tradeoffs and protected values.' 47
Another controversy arose in response to the SEC's proposal to impose a
mandatory 2% redemption fee on mutual fund shareholders who redeem shares
within five days of their purchase. 4 ' Yet another controversy arose over the SEC's
proposal to amend Rule 22c-1 by adopting a hard 4 p.m. close for mutual fund
orders.'49 A final controversial proposed SEC rule required members of the hedge
fund industry to register as investment advisors.' The SEC's Director of Investor
Education, Susan Ferris Wyderko, testified that the hedge fund industry invests
$1.2 trillion in assets.' On June 24, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit unanimously held that the SEC lacked the authority to regulate hedge
funds.5 2 The SEC's chair responded by stating that "despite the Commission's in-
vestor protection objective[,I its rule is arbitrary and in violation of law, [the
court's finding] requires that going forward we reevaluate the agency's approach to
144. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Beyond Outcomes: Measuring Procedural Utility, 57 OXFORD ECON.
PAPERS 90 (2005); see also Matthias Benz & Bruno S. Frey, Being Independent Raises Happiness at Work, 11
SWEDISH ECON. POL'Y REV. 95 (2004); Bruno S. Frey et al., Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, But
Also How Matters, 160 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 377 (2004). See generally Alois Stutzer & Bruno
S. Frey, Making International Organizations More Democratic, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 305 (2005).
145. See generally MARY FRANCES LUCE ET AL., EMOTIONAL DECISIONS: TRADEOFF DIFFICULTY AND COPING
IN CONSUMER CHOICE (2001).
146. See generally HAROLD WINTER, TRADE-OFFS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC REASONING AND SO-
CIAL ISSUES (2005).
147. Peter H. Huang, Emotional Reactions to Law and Economics, Market Metaphors, and Rationality Rheto-
ric, in THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Mark D. White ed., forthcoming).
148. Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Mandatory Redemption Fees for Mutual Fund Securities (Feb. 25,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-23.htm.
149. Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,388 (proposed Dec.
17, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
150. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10,
2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279); Deborah Solomon, New SEC Chief Plans to Enforce Hedge-
Fund Rule, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2005, at Al. See generally U.S. SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE
FUNDS (2003), available at http:/Iwww.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefundsO9O3.pdf.
151. lanthe Jeanne Dugan, Double Trouble Valuing the Hedge-Fund Industry, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2006, at B3
(reporting on confusion over the size of the hedge fund industry).
152. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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hedge fund activity."' 3 Legal scholars disagree over how much to regulate hedge
funds. 4
All of these above controversies over the proper boundaries of SEC regulation
also implicate questions about how to evaluate securities rules and whether CBA
should be part of such evaluations. Even if CBA should be part of the securities
regulatory process, other considerations can trump CBA. For example, one could
argue that insider trading or securities fraud should be illegal even if they lead to
financial benefits, such as equilibrium securities market prices conveying insider
information, exceeding their financial costs, because they lead to emotional im-
pacts, such as some individual retail investors not participating in securities mar-
kets due to a feeling that securities markets are not a level playing field.
The SEC's CBA of requiring independent board chairs and more independent
directors for mutual funds considered, among other costs, these:.. (1) search costs
to find qualified board candidates; (2) new board member salaries; (3) higher com-
pensation for independent board chairs; and (4) additional remuneration to retain
independent legal counsel and other support staff for new independent directors;
and, among other benefits, these:' (1) enhancing quality fund governance; (2)
fostering more capital formation; (3) increasing accountability by fund boards; and
(4) increasing market liquidity.
Requiring independent board chairs and more independent directors for mutual
funds would have these negative affective impacts: (1) a false sense of security by
fund shareholders resulting in less individual vigilance; (2) additional influence
costs;"' (3) reduced board cohesiveness; and (4) transition costs of changing board
cultures; and these positive affective impacts: (1) avoiding documented perverse,
psychological shortcomings to simply disclosing conflicts of interest;'58 (2) lower
decision-making anxiety for potential fund shareholders; (3) lower stress for ex-
153. Press Release, SEC, Statement of Chairman Cox Concerning the Decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals
in Phillip Goldstein, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission (June 23, 2006), available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-101 .htm.
154. Robert C. Pozen, Hedge Funds Today: To Regulate or Not?, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2005, at A14 (discuss-
ing some concerns about hedge funds); David Skeel, Behind the Hedge, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2005, at 28
(providing examples of bad hedge fund behavior); Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds (Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Series No. 71, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913045.
155. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,985, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,390,
39,391-96 (July 7, 2005).
156. Id. at 39,395-96.
157. Margaret Meyer et al., Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes, 1 J. EcON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 9 (1992).
158. Daylian M. Cain et al., Coming Clean but Playing Dirtier: The Shortcomings of Disclosure as a Solution
to Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 104 (Don A. Moore et al. eds., 2005) (presenting evidence that disclosing conflicts of
interest can have two perverse effects: (1) disclosers behave in more biased fashion; and (2) audiences of
disclosure insufficiently discount for conflict of interest); Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean:
Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005) (same).
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isting fund shareholders; and (4) placebo effects.'59 The SEC could analyze whether
investor concern about mutual fund board independence supports increasing the
percentage of independent directors on mutual fund boards from 50% to 75%. The
SEC also could address whether and how much of a reduction in levels of mutual
fund investors' anxiety justifies requiring mutual funds to retain independent board
chairs. More generally, the SEC should take into account recent economic theoreti-
cal research about how anxiety and fear can affect people's consumption, invest-
ment, and savings decisions. 6 ' Economists recently have begun to analyze
theoretical models of how regulators can and should take into account and utilize
such affect as anxiety or fear to influence people's behavior. 6'
The first positive affective impact mentioned above requires explicitly comparing
the proposed substantive regulation with the most common policy alternative in
the SEC's regulatory toolkit, namely mandatory disclosure. The affirming majority
of the SEC's commissioners merely and summarily asserted buzzwords and a man-
tra, 62 without engaging in any real analysis of how much this rule promotes inves-
tor confidence.'63 Both dissenting SEC commissioners criticized and questioned the
affirming majority for such vague assertions. 64 Thus, a large part of the contro-
versy over these proposed mutual fund governance rules was over the actual size of
a particular and often cited positive affective impact, namely that of more investor
confidence and greater trust in securities markets. In other words, the controversy
over these mutual fund governance rules can be seen in large part as differences in
beliefs over whether the SEC can and should perform more formal analysis of how
proposed securities regulations affect investor confidence. The SEC should obtain
159. Amitai Aviram, In Defense of Imperfect Compliance Programs, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 773-74
(2005).
160. See, e.g., Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, Psychological Expected Utility Theory and Anticipatory Feelings,
116 Q.J. EcoN. 55, 66-72 (2001) (providing the first theoretical model of how anticipatory emotions can alter
economic behavior); Wojciech Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, Denial of Death and Economic Behavior, 5 ADVANCES
THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 18-20 (2005) (providing the first theoretical model of the impact of denial and fear of
death upon consumption and saving decisions).
161. See Andrew Caplin & Jonathan Leahy, Behavioral Policy, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECI-
SIONs 73, 79-85 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003) (outlining theoretical challenges that anxiety
and stress pose for analyzing such educational policies as genetic testing and providing financial retirement
savings information); Andrew Caplin, Fear as a Policy Instrument, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 441-58 (George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003)
(providing the first theoretical model of how to utilize fear-inducing messages to motivate citizens to undertake
preventive care); Andrew Caplin & Kfir Eliaz, AIDS Policy and Psychology: A Mechanism-Design Approach, 34
RAND J. ECON. 631, 631-32 (2003) (providing the first theoretical model of AIDS policy when people are
fearful of AIDS testing); Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, The Supply of Information by a Concerned Expert, 114
EcON. J. 487 (2004) (providing the first theoretical model of the optimal disclosure procedure for doctors
facing potentially anxious patients); Botond K6szegi, Health Anxiety and Patient Behavior, 22 J. HEALTH ECON.
1073 (2003) (providing the first theoretical model of patients' anxiety over their health and consequences of
such fears and stress for patient decision-making about information acquisition and treatment).
162. Investment Company Governance, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,390, 396, 400-01 (July 7, 2005) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 270).
163. Id. at 39,396.
164. Id. at 39,405, 408.
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evidence from, among other sources, a request for public comment and empirical
affective data as to whether and, if so, how much proposed rules actually would
promote the positive affective impact of greater investor confidence and trust in
securities markets.
IV. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN SECURITIES REGULATION
A. Current Practice of CBA by the SEC and Other U.S. Financial Regulators
As a general empirical and factual matter, SEC rulemakings often contain sections
with apparently extensive CBA. A casual perusal of many SEC proposed and final
rules finds a surprisingly larger percentage of pages devoted to discussing CBA. For
example, the final version of the above-mentioned mutual fund governance rule
contained a section III, entitled Discussion, which had a subsection A. Costs Re-
sulting From Exemptive Rule Amendments.'65 Both concurring and dissenting SEC
Commissioners also engaged in their own additional CBA discussions."' Thus, a
total of 78% to 79% of the pages in the final version of this rule are devoted to CBA
discussions. This might not be surprising because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit remanded this rule to the SEC for consideration of its costs. 67
Another example of an SEC proposal is a rule defining the term "nationally rec-
ognized statistical rating organization" contained in a section entitled Considera-
tion of the Costs and Benefits of Proposed Rule, which made up approximately
12% to 13% of the pages in that proposal.'68 A careful examination of these and
other such pages reveals that as the SEC practices it, CBA is often uninformative,
should not be taken seriously, and ultimately is likely counterproductive. Also, the
amount, level, quality, and sophistication of CBA is extremely disappointing in
those areas where affective impacts are crucial, such as those often cited by the SEC,
affective positive impacts of investor confidence and trust on the integrity of securi-
ties markets.
As a matter of general impression, the SEC rulemaking process clearly at least
appears to attempt some discussion of CBA. Reasonable people can debate whether
SEC attempts at CBA are more analogous to disingenuous image or public relations
and informational management spin or instead sincere public discourse and infor-
mation acquisition and examination. Reasonable individuals also can disagree over
whether SEC discussions of CBA are understandable reactions to perceived demand
by securities investors and securities industry professionals for the SEC to engage in
CBA justifications of its rulemaking, or alternatively overreactions, analogous to
165. Id. at 39,391-95.
166. Id. at 39,399-401, 403-08.
167. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
168. Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, Securities Act Release No. 8,570,
Exchange Act Release No. 51,572, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,834, 70 Fed. Reg. 21,306, 21,319-21
(proposed Apr. 25, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
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the practice of defensive medicine by physicians due to fears of unjustified mal-
practice lawsuits.
Thus, while the SEC engages in CBA in a quite haphazard and an ad hoc fashion,
the SEC typically does not perform formal, systematic CBA of its regulations.
Neither do any of these other U.S. financial regulators: the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC); the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC);
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (Fed); and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). But, current SEC Commissioner Annette Nazareth, during a Senate Banking
Committee confirmation hearing of her nomination, stated that she was "keenly
aware of the cost of regulation and the importance of balancing these costs with the
benefits that regulation seeks to achieve."'69 Each of the aforementioned U.S. finan-
cial regulators, the SEC, CFTC, FDIC, FTC, and Fed, is exempt from those major
provisions of the executive orders that require CBA by executive agencies. 7 ' Their
exemptions exist because they are so-called independent regulatory agencies, not
executive agencies.1'
The phrase "independent agency" is naturally ironic because "independent" fi-
nancial regulatory agencies, such as the, SEC "are not independent of politics; they
are highly dependent upon the industries that they are charged with regulating.
That dependency is mediated through Congress, which uses its mediating role to
extract financial support from the financial services industry, accounting firms and
public companies."'72 The SEC and the other aforementioned U.S. financial regula-
tors differ in this regard at least statutorily from U.S. executive agencies, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency, which engages in CBA more regularly and rou-
tinely than it does not, in evaluating alternative regulations about environmental
social risks.'73 Of course, applications of CBA to environmental, health, and safety
regulations understandably have generated much contentious debate and heated
controversy." 4 Some believe that, as is also possible with an increasingly influential
169. Deborah Solomon, Moving the Market: Cox Pledges to Leave Stock-Options Rule Alone, N.Y. TIMES, July
27, 2005, at C3.
170. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (Feb. 17, 1981); Exec. Order No. 12,866 of September 30,
1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
171. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2000).
172. A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1092 (2005).
173. Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1656-63 (2001).
174. See Symposium, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 837 (2000); see also FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 35-40 (2004); EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS,
ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER, IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS 382-84 (2005); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 141-50 (1987); Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 913, 913-14 (2000); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law
and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1362 (1986); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Piercing Pareto Superiority: Real People
and the Obligations of Legal Theory, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1997); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 422-45 (1981).
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Precautionary Principle,17 5 certain politicians and interest groups utilize CBA for
delay, inaction, and regulatory paralysis.'76
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis as Rationality of Social Decision Making
In 1772, Benjamin Franklin recommended a decision procedure in a famous letter
to Joseph Priestly (a British scientist, who is known for inventing soda pop water in
1772, and co-discovering oxygen in 1774):
[W]rite down the pros and cons for each alternative choice and assign a weight
(0 to +10) to each pro and each con (0 to -10), indicating how important that
factor is. By adding up the pros and cons (each weight) you get a total score for
each alternative choice. Then, by comparing the totals for each alternative
course of action, you can usually determine the best choice.177
Clearly, this decision procedure is a form of CBA.
It should involve weighing the eventual effectiveness of the solution in solving
the problem, your emotional well being during and after the solution, the time
and effort required, and your overall personal and interpersonal well being in
the end. This is a very complex process, mostly used with important
decisions. '7
In a sense, CBA simply generalizes to social decision-making an individual deci-
sion-making procedure. If we denote total benefits to some decision, d, as TB(d)
and total costs of that decision, d, as TC(d), then CBA is a procedure for solving
Max [TB(d)-TC(d)]. If both total benefits and total costs are differentiable func-
tions of the decision variable, then the first order necessary condition for an opti-
mal d* is that value of d, d*, which satisfies MB(d*) - MC(d*) = 0, or MB(d*) =
MC(d*).179 In other words, the value of the decision variable that maximizes the net
difference between total benefits and total costs satisfies the equation marginal ben-
efits equal marginal costs. If total benefits and total costs are twice differentiable
175. See, e.g., Mike Feintuck, Precautionary Maybe, But What's the Principle? The Precautionary Principle, the
Regulation of Risk, and the Public Domain, 32 J.L. & Soc'Y 371, 372, 393 (2005). But see Dan M. Kahan et al.,
Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1071-74 (2006) (review-
ing and critiquing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005)).
176. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 293 (2002) (stating that
"[amny effort to ensure cost-benefit balancing should ensure that it does not produce 'paralysis by analysis"');
see also Christopher J. Anderson, The Psychology of Doing Nothing: Forms of Decision Avoidance Result from
Reason and Emotion, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 139 (2003).
177. CLAYTON E. TUCKER-LADD, PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-HELP 1310 (2004), available at http://mhnet.org/
psyhelp/chap 13/chap 13p.htm.
178. Id.
179. BRIAN BEAVIs & IAN M. DOBBS, OPTIMIZATION AND STABILITY THEORY FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 34
(1990).
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functions of the decision variable and strictly concave and strictly convex functions
of the decision variable, respectively, (that is, MB is a strictly decreasing function of
d and MC is a strictly increasing function of d) and the decision variable belongs to
a compact, convex set, then both the first and second order conditions for a strict
maximum will be satisfied.18 This means that equating marginal benefits and mar-
ginal costs is also a sufficient condition to solve for the unique optimal d*.
A central question about CBA is at what level of detail and formality should we
engage in CBA? An ever-changing apocryphal story,"8 ' attributed to Howard
Raiffa, 85 a co-founder of modern decision theory, is relevant. Raiffa was discussing
with his dean and friend at Columbia an employment offer that he had received
from Harvard. His colleague jokingly told Raiffa to set up a decision tree analysis of
his choice problem and act accordingly. Raiffa responded this was a serious deci-
sion and that formal decision analysis is a fine mechanical aid or tool for trivial
decisions, but such decisions as where to live and work, whom to date and marry,
and whether and how many children to have are too important for formal decision
analysis because such analyses miss too much. I"3
Raiffa's response suggests that utilizing formal CBA has diminishing marginal
productivity in such personal domains. While people may informally estimate and
weigh approximate pros and cons of various alternatives in making decisions about
whether to date, marry, or have children with another particular individual, people
also may feel that formally engaging in CBA for such important and personal
choices is at best foolhardy and misguided, and at worst inappropriate and self-
defeating. In the words of personal advice from a legal scholar, there is and should
be neither calculating nor calculations in romantic love.8 4
Recent psychological research finds that people utilize dual processing systems
involving two different modes of valuation:' valuation by calculation and valua-
tion by feeling. Two economists recently developed a theoretical model in which
people maximize a weighted sum of scalar outcomes resulting from two
processes. 88 A deliberative process corresponds to conventional non-affective ra-
tional choice. Another affective process corresponds to emotions and motivational
drives. Their model analytically captures a familiar being "of two minds" experi-
ence. Their particular linear functional form for combining separate deliberation
180. See, e.g., id. at 28, 36; KELVIN LANCASTER, MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 17 (1968).
181. MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 63-64 (5th ed. 2002).
182. See generally HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER
UNCERTAINTY (2d ed. 1970).
183. Huang, supra note 147.
184. Personal Communication with Marleen A. O'Connor (Sept. 10, 2005) (on file with author).
185. Christopher K. Hsee & Yuval Rottenstreich, Music, Pandas, and Muggers: On the Affective Psychology of
Value, 133 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 23 (2004).
186. George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, Animal Spirits: Affective and Deliberative Processes in Eco-
nomic Behavior (May 4, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.hss.cmu.edu/departments/
sds/faculty/Loewenstein/wi117_04.pdf).
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and affective processes is merely a heuristic representation, intended to be familiar
and helpful to conventionally trained neoclassical economists.'87
Presumably, what many people find annoying, disconcerting, and frustrating
about CBA is that it reduces contextually rich decisions into simply a matter of
doing arithmetic. As one corporate law scholar noted, calculations in both personal
and commercial relationships are complicated, but even the latter are more compli-
cated than supporters of calculations think.' Another related critique of CBA is
that it often involves "projections" of future values, even purely monetary figures,
which seem really to be just made up, e.g., GDP growth, or stock market ups or
downs over the next several years. One reason that many people find CBA exasper-
ating is that CBA misses or significantly undervalues non-market based and subjec-
tive values. In other words, what a lot of individuals find problematic about CBA in
practice often is that it excludes hard-to-measure benefits and costs or soft variables
and hence overlooks important factors.8 9 A more fundamental problem with CBA
is that what are or should count as benefits and costs are not necessarily clear, but
are taken instead as being immutably given by policymakers. 9 ° In addition, there
are well-known conceptual ambiguities, practical difficulties, and theoretical chal-
lenges to eliciting truthfully an individual's preferences or valuations in a number
of non-affective contexts: agricultural economics, 9' environmental economics,'92
experimental economics,' public economics,'94 and marketing. 9 '
Neoclassical economics assumed that because people are rational, economists
could infer an individual's private, subjective, and unobservable preferences from
that individual's public, objective, and observable behavior in terms of market
choices. This revealed preference approach requires that preference orderings are
well-behaved, not only in the sense of satisfying certain mathematical axioms, such
187. Julie A. Nelson, Rationality and Humanity: A View from Feminist Economics 17 (Global Dev. & Env't
Inst., Working Paper No. 05-04, 2005), available at http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/05-
04RationalityHumanity.pdf.
188. See Claire A. Hill, Law and Economics in the Personal Sphere, 29 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 219, 253 (2004)
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992), ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000),
ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS (1999), and MAR-
GARET BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY (2000)).
189. HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 372 (2003).
190. Claire A. Hill, Beyond Mistakes: The Next Wave of Behavioural Law and Economics, 29 QUEEN'S L.J. 563,
582 (2004) (pointing out how CBA presupposes that categories of costs and benefits are known already).
191. See, e.g., Jayson L. Lusk et al., Experimental Auction Procedure: Impact on Valuation of Quality Differen-
tiated Goods, 86 AM. J. AGRiC. ECON. 389 (2004).
192. See, e.g., Robert Sugden, Anomalies and Stated Preference Techniques: A Framework for a Discussion of
Coping Strategies, 32 ENVTL. & RES. ECON. 1 (2005).
193. See, e.g., Glenn W. Harrison et al., Experimental Methods and Elicitation of Values, 7 EXPERIMENTAL
ECON. 123, 124 (2004).
194. See, e.g., Ronald G. Cummings & Laura 0. Taylor, Unbiased Value Estimates for Environmental Goods:
A Cheap Talk Design for the Contingent Valuation Method, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 649, 649 (1999).
195. Matthew C. Rousu et al., Consumer Willingness to Pay for "Second-Generation" Genetically Engineered
Products and the Role of Marketing Information, 37 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. 647, 648 (2005).
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as the weak axiom of revealed preference;'96 but also, more crucially in the sense of
being stable across contexts and over time. Much of recent behavioral and experi-
mental economics research empirically demonstrates how much so-called prefer-
ences are constructed from,'97 and sensitive to, situational contexts. 9 Experimental
economist Charles Plott proposed that people discover their preferences through a
process of deliberation, information gathering, and trial-and-error learning.'99
V. IS THE SEC REQUIRED BY LAW TO PERFORM ONLY CBA?
In a 2006 summer blockbuster movie, the character Lord Cutler Beckett declares
that "loyalty is no longer the currency of the realm." When another character, Eliza-
beth Swann, then asks him what is the currency of the realm, he replies that:
"[c]urrency is the currency of the realm."2" This Part examines whether the SEC is
required by the language of its organizing statutes to utilize money and wealth as
exclusive currencies for evaluating its rules, or whether that statutory language pro-
vides the SEC discretion to also utilize affective and subjective well-being impacts
as currencies in promulgating securities regulations.
The organic statutes of the SEC require that the SEC rulemaking process con-
sider some notion of "efficiency" among other desired economic objectives because
the "Definitions" parts of each of its organizing statutes: the Securities Act of
1933;01 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; 02 the Investment Company Act of
1940;203 and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940;104 mandate that the SEC in
promulgating rules "consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether
the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation." So, there
appears to be statutory textual bases for CBA in SEC rulemaking because CBA also
involves a particular economic notion of efficiency, namely Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency. °5 But, does promoting "efficiency" necessarily mean CBA? There are at least
four competing, different concepts of economic efficiency,206 two providing differ-
196. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Rational Choice Functions and Orderings, 26 ECONOMICA 121, 123 (1959).
197. See, e.g., Lucy F. Ackert et al., When the Shoe Is on the Other Foot: Experimental Evidence on Evaluation
Disparities 1-2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper 2005-17, 2005), available at www.frbatlanta.org.
198. See, e.g., CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
199. Charles R. Plott, Rational Individual Behavior in Markets and Social Choice Processes: The Discovered
Preference Hypothesis, in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds.,
1996).
200. PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: DEAD MAN'S CHEST (Walt Disney Pictures 2006).
201. .15 U.S.C. § 77b-2(b) (2000).
202. Id. § 78c-2(f).
203. Id. § 80a-2(c).
204. Id. § 80b-2(c).
205. See, e.g., ZERBE & DIVELY, supra note 5, at 12-13.
206. Two additional forms of efficiency not considered here are Keynesian efficiency (which focuses on lost
potential output when an economy experiences recession and thus less than full employment of labor and
resources) and Schumpeterian efficiency (which addresses technical innovation, market leadership, and indus-
trial stabilization). See ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: The VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS 24-28
(1996).
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ing conceptions of financial or informational efficiency, and two involving alterna-
tive notions of allocational efficiency. In addition, there is Judge Richard Posner's
notion of efficiency as total wealth maximization.2 °7 In light of these multiple inter-
pretations of what efficiency can mean, how should the SEC interpret "efficiency"
from its organizing statutes?
A. Informational Efficiencies
First, financial economists along with some corporate and securities law scholars
utilize the word "efficiency" in the context of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypoth-
esis (ECMH). °s Second, some corporate and securities legal scholars differentiate
informational efficiency in the sense of the ECMH from another concept of infor-
mational efficiency known as fundamental (value) efficiency.2"9 The difference be-
tween these concepts is that a securities "market is 'informationally efficient' if
certain classes of information are immediately incorporated into a stock's price; a
market is 'fundamentally efficient' if a stock's price reflects only information relat-
ing to the net present value of the corporation's future profits."21 Recently, a num-
ber of legal scholars have questioned the relevance of informational efficiency for
securities regulation21' on the grounds that securities markets might result in allo-
cations that are socially undesirable even if informationally efficient.
207. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119-35
(1979). For criticisms of wealth maximization as efficiency, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth
Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 512, 525-26 (1980); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 191, 191-92 (1980); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 227, 227-28 (1980).
208. See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 115, at 333-37 (defining the ECMH and three levels of efficiency);
STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 33-35 (2005) (discussing
three versions of the ECMH); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 384-88 (1970) (defining an efficient capital market); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 553 (1984) (introducing the notion of
informational efficiency to corporate and securities law scholarship).
209. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 208, at 36 (distinguishing between informational and fundamental
efficiency); Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945,
946-47 (1991) (same); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and
Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 646-47 (1995) (same); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market
Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 641 (2003) (distinguishing between infor-
mational efficiency and fundamental value efficiency); William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock
Market is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 344-49 (1986) (same).
210. Ayres, supra note 209, at 946-47.
211. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 854 (1992) (contrasting the huge difference between the persistent conception of
market efficiency in the dominant legal culture versus that among economists); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimpor-
tance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV.
613, 618 (1988) (finding "that the connection between prices in the public trading markets for stocks and the
allocation of real resources is a weak one, and that stock markets may have far less allocative importance than
has generally been assumed"); see also Lynn A. Stout, Inefficient Markets and the New Finance, 14 J. FIN. TRANS-
FORMATION 95, 96 (2005) (critiquing ideas of security market efficiency).
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B. Pareto Allocational Efficiency
Third, non-financial economists outside of the contexts of CBA and the University
of Chicago style of law and economics utilize the term "efficiency" to mean a con-
cept of allocational efficiency as defined by the Italian economist, Vilfredo Pareto." 2
An allocation of resources is termed Pareto efficient if there is no reallocation of
resources that could make one person better off according to that person's own
preferences and make nobody else worse off according to their own preferences. A
pair of pioneering economists, the already mentioned American Kenneth Joseph
Arrow, a co-recipient of the 1972 Alfred Nobel Prize in Economic Science, and the
French-born American Gerard Debreu, the recipient of the 1983 Alfred Nobel Prize
in Economic Science, created a mathematical model of and proved that the opera-
tion of a perfectly competitive system of markets results in equilibrium allocation
of resources that is Pareto efficient.2 3 Thus, Arrow and Debreu clarified and for-
malized the famous metaphor of the Scottish political economist, Adam Smith, of
an "invisible hand" for a system of perfectly competitive markets that is able to
guide the decentralized choices of individuals pursuing their own self-interest into
an aggregate outcome that is normatively and socially desirable in a precise and
technical, but also limited and restrictive, sense.1 4
C. Kaldor-Hicks Allocational Efficiency
Fourth and finally, non-financial economists and many legal scholars utilize the
word "efficiency" in the context of CBA to mean another form of allocational effi-
ciency, termed Kaldor-Hicks (KH) efficiency, named after a famous economist,
Nicholas Kaldor, and another famous economist and co-recipient of the 1972 Al-
fred Nobel Prize in Economic Science, Sir John Richard Hicks. An allocation of
resources is KH efficient if there is no reallocation of resources that makes those
who gain so much better off that they remain better off even if they were to com-
pensate those who lose from that reallocation. Kaldor's hypothetical compensation
test asks, after a reallocation of resources, if the maximum amount of money that
winners are willing to pay exceeds the minimum amount of money that losers are
willing to accept.15
A famous economist, Tibor de Scitovsky, demonstrated that there can be two
allocations of resources, call them A and B, such that a move from A to B passes
212. See, e.g., ARROW, supra note 7, at 19 (defining Pareto efficiency); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of
Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1215 (1991) (same).
213. Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22
ECONOMETRICA 265, 266 (1954) (providing their pioneering model of a general equilibrium and proving that
under certain hypotheses, a competitive general equilibrium allocation exists and is Pareto efficient).
214. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. 4, ch. 2
(1776).
215. Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J.
549, 550 (1939).
VOL. 3 NO. 2 2008
How DO SECURITIES LAWS INFLUENCE AFFECT, HAPPINESS, & TRUST?
Kaldor's hypothetical compensation test, but so does a move from B to A.216 Scitov-
sky developed a different, but related hypothetical compensation test, asking if the
maximum amount of money losers are willing to pay winners to prevent such a
proposed reallocation is less than the minimum amount of money that winners are
willing to accept as a bribe to forgo the reallocation. This hypothetical compensa-
tion test is a reallocation of resources from the viewpoint of losers. A proposed
reallocation of resources passes Scitovsky's criterion if that reallocation passes both
Kaldor's and Scitovsky's hypothetical compensation tests. In other words, the
Scitovsky criterion is the above pair of hypothetical compensation tests. Hicks
demonstrated the relationships between Kaldor's hypothetical compensation test
and Scitovsky's criterion and two concepts in microeconomic applied price theory,
known as compensating variations and equivalent variations.217
Economists and legal scholars asserting efficiency of CBA typically mean effi-
ciency in the sense of Kaldor-Hicks. Scholars criticizing efficiency of CBA typically
find Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to be an unsatisfactory welfare criterion for evaluating
social policy because winners do not actually compensate losers, even when those
winners under a KH efficiency standard hypothetically can compensate losers and
still end up better off net of such compensation. More generally, traditional law
and economics scholars, like economists, are interested in efficiency. However, legal
scholars concerned with questions of identity have focused their investigations on
issues of subordination, identity, cultural context, and legal indeterminacy.218 In
other words, efficiency of any type fails to address issues that are not related to a
particular type of efficiency, including such affective concerns as those arising from
envy,"' jealousy,22 and procedural or process considerations.
D. Indeterminacy of Efficiency
It makes a difference whether the SEC interprets efficiency in an informational or
allocational sense because there are equilibrium allocations that result from a sys-
tem of perfectly competitive markets that are informationally efficient, but not al-
locationally efficient, and vice versa.22' Corporate finance scholars,222 judicial
223 lawopinions,"' corporate law and securities regulation scholars,224 and even the SEC
216. T. De Scitovszky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV. ECON. STUD. 77, 88 (1941).
217. J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696, 700 (1939).
218. See generally JORDAN & HARRIS, supra note 174.
219. But see Hal Varian, Equity, Envy, and Efficiency, 9 J. EcON. THEORY 63 (1974).
220. Mui, supra note 20, at 312.
221. See James Dow & Gary Gorton, Stock Market Efficiency and Economic Efficiency: Is There A Connec-
tion?, 52 J. FIN. 1087, 1109, 1113 (1997) (proving that informational efficiency is neither sufficient nor neces-
sary for allocational efficiency); see also RUBEN LEE, WHAT IS AN EXCHANGE? THE AUTOMATION, MANAGEMENT,
AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 221-24 (1998) (discussing how allocational efficiency differs from
informational efficiency).
222. See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 115, at 337.
223. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) ("Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm
Congress' premise that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly availa-
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itself,225 usually employ the word "efficiency" to mean informational efficiency in
the sense of the ECMH.226 This textual ambiguity means that any statutory basis for
the SEC to perform CBA is attenuated in comparison with a traditional executive
order standard because the notion of "efficiency" is not self-evidently the concept
of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency that is routinely utilized in CBA. Also, there is no statu-
tory textual basis providing any guidance for how the SEC should balance any
particular notion of promoting efficiency in performing CBA against each of these
other goals: protection of investors, promotion of competition, and encouragement
of capital formation.
Finally, examining the legislative history to help determine statutory intent is
unhelpful because various notions of informational efficiency arose only after pas-
sage of the organic statutes of the SEC. Although economists already developed
notions of allocational efficiency before the passage of the organic statutes of the
SEC, widespread regulatory adoption of CBA and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency gained
momentum only during the 1980s with the rise of the modern regulatory state,227
coming several decades after passage of the organic statutes of the SEC. It is also
possible that "efficiency" in the organic statutes of the SEC should be interpreted to
have its plain English meaning of a lack of wastefulness. Although such a meaning
is related to, it does not exactly coincide with either Kaldor-Hicks or Pareto alloca-
tional efficiency. Whatever definition of efficiency the SEC adopts, there remain
problems with a lack of legislative history and statutory textual guidance about
balancing efficiency against other notions of efficiency, investor protection, encour-
aging capital formation, and fostering competition.
VI. AFFECTIVE IMPACTS OF VARIOUS SECURITIES LAWS
Empirically, the SEC's favorite component of its regulatory toolbox is mandatory
securities disclosure.228 Both the overarching philosophy and underlying principle
of U.S. federal securities regulation can be summed up by the phrase: disclosure,
ble information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations."); Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892
F.2d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 1989) ("The Securities and Exchange Commission believes that markets correctly value
the securities of well-followed firms, so that new sales may rely on information that has been digested and
expressed in the security's price."); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286-87 (D.N.J. 1989) (providing a
five-factor test for when a market is efficient for purposes of the fraud-on-the-market principle).
224. See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 208; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Foreword: Revisiting
Gilson and Kraakman's Efficiency Story, 28 J. CORP. L. 499, 500 (2003) (discussing the seminal contributions of
Gilson & Kraakman's article).
225. See, e.g., STAFF OF H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC (Comm. Print 1977).
226. But see William 0. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in A Time of Madness?,
54 EMORY L.J. 843, 847 (2005) (raising technical and theoretical challenges over applying the ECMH underly-
ing the so-called fraud-on-the-market doctrine to securities fraud cases that arose from the Internet, high-tech,
and telecommunications bubble during 1998-2001).
227. SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 10.
228. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1023
(2000) ("Mandatory disclosure is a-if not the-defining characteristic of U.S. securities regulation.").
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more disclosure, and even further disclosure. Proposed SEC rules that mandate
disclosure of director and executive compensation provide a recent example of a
tried and true regulatory propensity to favor disclosure over more direct or "hands
on" command and control regulation.229 In commenting on the likely impact of
rules mandating disclosure of CEO compensation, former SEC Commissioner Jo-
seph A. Grundfest quipped that the half-life of shame is much shorter than that of
envy.23 Other SEC rules concern the timing of certain voluntary information pro-
vision, such as rules against gun-jumping in registered public offerings.23 An often
recurring regulatory option is offering and targeting financial education designed
to improve financial literacy, investment behavior, and retirement planning.232
Another perennial regulatory favorite is the use of default rules. An example is
provided by default allocations in retirement plans." Another example is that of
default provisions or contractual terms in personal credit card borrowing.3 A re-
cent example is Larry Ribstein's "humble" approach to securities regulation23 that
permits "actors to self-define their certification level," '236 or that would "impose a
minimum standard but permit firms to 'comply or explain'-that is, opt out of
compliance as long as they explain that they are doing so."237 Another recent exam-
ple is Roberta Romano's proposal that firms be able to opt-into regulation.3 A
final regulatory proposal is Robert Clark's novel idea for building into regulation a
continual research and ongoing reassessment adjustment procedure. 39 Securities
regulators can fine-tune policies in response to feedback that analyzing ex post
affective impacts provides over time. In this manner, analysis of affective impacts
will help provide an empirical basis for and principled approach to evolving
regulation.
A previous analysis of emotional consequences of mandatory securities disclo-
sures provides an example of analyzing the affective impacts of securities regula-
229. Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Propose Changes to Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive
Compensation and Related Matters (Jan. 17, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-I0.htm.
230. Personal Communication with Joseph A. Grundfest (May 7, 2006) (on file with author).
231. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000) (stating the so-called gun-jumping rules); see also CRo & PRITCHARD,
supra note 208, at 423-63 (discussing the so-called gun-jumping rules).
232. See, e.g., U.S. Financial Literacy and Education Commission, http://www.mymoney.gov (last visited
Feb. 10, 2008).
233. See Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrowrm: Using Behavioral Economics to
Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164, S170-71 (2004); see also Henrik Cronqvist & Richard H.
Thaler, Design Choices in Privatized Social-Security Systems: Learning from the Swedish Experience, 94 AM. ECON.
REV. 424, 424-25 (2004) (discussing designing default funds).
234. Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CH. L. REV. 249, 266-67 (2006) (imagining a
Borrow Less Today plan).
235. BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, at 97.
236. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to Nirvana, supra note 2, at 296.
237. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years, supra note 2.
238. See Romano, supra note 2, at 1596 (proposing changing SOX's corporate governance mandates into
statutory defaults).
239. Clark, supra note 2, at 312.
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tion.24° That analysis defined irrational exuberance and anxiety and explained how
both types of affect have policy and regulatory implications for a long-standing
debate over the rationales for, and effectiveness of, mandatory securities disclo-
sures. In particular, that analysis observed that even if some affect dissipates, inves-
tor euphoria or anxiety already may respectively "affect issuers of securities in terms
of a lower or higher cost of capital due to such emotional reactions."241 Affective
impacts may be temporary or able to be learned-away; but even if they are so, that
does not mean they should not be counted because they often will have irreversible
and permanent consequences upon such traditional economic variables as levels of
aggregate consumption, credit card debt, investment, stock prices, and stock vol-
ume. Rather than reproduce more details from that earlier analysis, the rest of this
Part offers a "top ten" list of related but new thoughts about analyzing affective
impacts of particular categories of securities regulations.
A. Affective Impacts of Mandatory Securities Disclosures
Standard analyses of mandatory securities disclosures, like most forms of mandated
information provision, do not adequately consider emotional reactions to informa-
tion. It is well-recognized that investors can suffer cognitively from information
overload in terms of being unable to cognitively process and understand too much
information.242 But people also can suffer affectively from information overload in
terms of feeling anger, annoyance, apathy, boredom, frustration, helplessness, list-
lessness, and stress upon receipt of too much (or too little) information or infor-
mation too quickly (or too slowly). Thus, mandating additional securities
disclosures might produce little or no cognitive benefits in the form of better finan-
cial decision making, yet potentially large emotional impacts in the form of affec-
tive overload. Analysis of affective consequences of information regulation should
not be limited to securities law. Affective impacts of regulating information provi-
sion should be considered in all of these contexts: federally mandated and stan-
dardized information disclosures provided to credit card and other open-ended
credit consumers;24 federal regulation of specific disclosures required for such
closed-end, that is, installment loans as those for automobiles and home mort-
240. Peter H. Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities Markets, in THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 501, 520-23 (Francesco Paresi & Vernon Smith eds., 2005) (analyzing
emotional benefits and costs to mandatory securities disclosures).
241. Id. at 520.
242. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded By the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities
Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 441 (2003) (highlighting concerns about investors, securities analysts, bro-
kers, and money managers all experiencing information overload from disclosures mandated by federal securi-
ties laws); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending:
Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707 (2006) (applying literature on decision-making from psychology and behavioral
economics to analyze predatory lending).
243. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119
Stat. 23 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 12, and 18 U.S.C.); Truth in Lending Act, 70
Fed. Reg. 60,235 (Oct. 17, 2005) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
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gages;244 federal consumer protection Statutes prohibiting deceptive advertising and
misleading statements;24 s products liability or tort law's imposition on manufactur-
ers of a duty to warn;246 and more generally our common law of contracts. 47 All
too frequently, regulators advocate more disclosure to remedy informational asym-
metries. A noteworthy exception is a 2005 symposium entitled Federal Consumer
Protection Regulation: Disclosures and Beyond hosted by the Payment Cards Center
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 28 A recommendation of that sympo-
sium's participants is to seek input from marketers, researchers, and focus groups
of consumers for creating and revising disclosures,249 in addition "to in-
corporat[ing] lessons from the field of communication theory into the disclosure
creation process."2 '
B. Should the SEC Worry About Scaring Investors?
Another affective impact for some people from additional mandatory securities
disclosures is what behavioral economist George Loewenstein has called the "work
of worry," a delightful phrase that captures the idea that if people engage in certain
risky activities despite their experiencing fear about some possible bad conse-
quences of such activities, their fear is a deadweight loss of suffering. Loewenstein
and Ted O'Donoghue provide two important and timely examples of the work of
worry. 5 Their first example is a terrorist alert warning system that offers no gui-
dance as to how individuals can alter their behavior to improve their safety, im-
poses privacy costs on many individuals, inconveniences most airline passengers,
and terrifies a great number of ordinary individuals. Their second and more con-
troversial set of examples are health and safety warnings that have little or no effect,
except for scaring their intended target audience in addition to perhaps others.
More generally, as Loewenstein and O'Donoghue noted, mandating information
provision might not be an example of asymmetric paternalism or conservative reg-
ulation,25 2 or libertarian paternalism,2" or soft paternalism.5 4 Requiring provision
of information can impose large negative affective psychic impacts, such as fear,
244. See, e.g., Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2000); Consumer Credit Protection Act of
1968, 15 U.S.C. § 1601.
245. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1); Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
246. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipula-
tion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 693 (1999); Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limita-
tions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1195 (1994).
247. See generally Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in
Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REv. 565 (2006).
248. MARK 1. FURLETTI, FEDERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION REGULATION: DISCLOSURES AND BEYOND
(2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=802746.
249. Id. at 10-11.
250. Id. at 11.
251. George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, "Vk Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way": Negative
Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 200-01 (2006).
252. See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmet-
ric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003).
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guilt, or shame, without producing much in the form of any countervailing
benefits.
Loewenstein and O'Donoghue suggested that in the context of such medical test-
ing as mammograms for women and prostrate-specific antigen (PSA) tests for
men, scary messages are not only ineffective at convincing patients to seek testing,
but also trigger worst-case scenarios or fears and personal anxieties of many pa-
tients. They also suggested that although food labeling has clear nutritional infor-
mational benefits, it also can foster a neurotic and unhealthy atmosphere towards
eating. They instead supported restricting the supply of temptations, such as regu-
lating the content and portion size of food, or banning subliminal advertising. Such
supply-side restrictions could be more effective, with fewer emotional impacts in
terms of negative feelings, to combat a nationwide U.S. obesity epidemic,25 if there
genuinely is one,2"6 and if that epidemic can be fought. Recent empirical and theo-
retical research is burgeoning about economic and non-economic factors contrib-
uting to a rising trend in obesity.25 7 Two economists demonstrated empirically that
variation in health behaviors is due to genetic factors and behavior-specific situa-
tional influences.25 ' Another pair of economists recently statistically estimated a
negative relationship between obesity and self-reported happiness in the United
States, but a positive correlation between obesity and self-reported happiness in
Russia." 9 Thus, whether dieting or even obesity is associated with depression,
stress, and unhappiness not only varies across individuals, but also cultures.
C. Cultural, Diversity, and Heterogeneity in Affective Impacts of Securities
Disclosures
An individual's emotional reactions to any particular stimulus and regulatory pol-
icy are likely to be distributed non-uniformly over a population. Such individual
variation presents theoretical and empirical challenges for aggregation of affective
253. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not An Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1159 (2003); Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175
(2003).
254. See Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 149 (2006).
255. See Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the "Fat Tax": The Role of Food Taxes in Developed Economies, 78 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1221, 1223 (2005); SUPER SIZE ME (Samuel Goldwyn Films 2004).
256. See PAUL F. CAMPOS, THE OBESITY MYTH: WHY AMERICA'S OBSESSION WITH WEIGHT IS HAZARDOUS
TO YOUR HEALTH (2004); MICHAEL GARD & JAN WRIGHT, THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC: SCIENCE, MORALITY, AND
IDEOLOGY (2005); J. ERIC OLIVER, FAT POLITICS: THE REAL STORY BEHIND AMERICA'S OBESITY EPIDEMIC
(2006); Paul Campos, The Legalization of Fat: Law, Science, and the Construction of a Moral Panic (Univ. of
Colo. Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-16, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=902693.
257. Odelia Rosin, The Economic Causes of Obesity, J. ECON. SURVEYS (forthcoming 2008).
258. David M. Cutler & Edward Glaeser, What Explains Differences in Smoking, Drinking, and Other Health-
Related Behaviors?, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 238, 239 (2005).
259. Carol Graham & Andrew Felton, Variance in Obesity Across Cohorts and Countries: A Norms-Based
Explanation Using Happiness Surveys 21 (Brookings Inst., Ctr. on Soc. & Econ. Dynamics, Working Paper No.
42, 2005), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/dynamics/papers/CSED wp42.pdf
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impacts as well as regulatory policy based upon affective impacts.26° In the context
of securities regulation, there are multiple actual, intended, and potential audiences
to information transmissions that securities issuers make voluntarily or because
they are required to by law. Possible recipients of such messages include these
groups: small individual retail investors, large sophisticated institutional investors,
securities brokers, professional securities analysts, and securities fraud plaintiff's
attorneys. To be sure, even within each of these above groups, there is likely to be
much individual variation in affective responses to securities information. But
there are likely to be predictable differences across these groups in terms of their
average affective response to securities information. At least, some of these differ-
ences will be due to education, experience, and temperament. There also might be
individual variation in cognitive responses to securities information, but probably
less than for affective responses because people are both aware of and similarly
trained in their cognitive reactions to information. There is also psychological re-
search indicating that age-related changes in affect cause age differences in decision
making processes. 6' Finally, recent research finds that differences in people's eco-
nomic attitudes can be due to differences in their educational backgrounds,262 and
intensity of religious upbringing. 6 Consistent and systematic differences in affec-
tive processing of information across identifiable and observable subpopulations
means that disclosure should not come in a one-size-fits-all form, but should in-
stead be tailored for effectiveness to specific categories of financial decision-makers.
Although CBA can in principle deal with the reality that most regulations im-
pose uneven benefits and impose unequal costs on different subpopulations, in-
dexed by their age, ethnicity, income, race, sex, and wealth by differential weighting
of costs and benefits across these subgroups of people, CBA privileges those costs
and benefits that are not emotional impacts. A desirable and important feature of
analyzing affective and subjective well-being is being able to explicitly acknowledge
and evaluate regulations that are likely to provide different affective impacts upon
people of different ages, ethnicities, genders, and races. There is a large amount of
evidence that non-financial risk perceptions generally vary across gender and
race.264
260. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207,
229 (2006).
261. Quinn Kennedy & Mara Mather, Aging, Affect, and Decision Making, in Do EMOTIONS HELP OR HURT
DECISION MAKING?: A HEDGEFOXIAN PERSPECTIVE 245 (Kathleen D. Vohs et al. eds., 2007).
262. Luigi Guiso et al., The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 526, 544-45
(2004).
263. See Luigi Guiso et al., People's Opium? Religion and Economic Attitudes, 50 J. MONETARY ECON. 225,
228 (2003).
264. See Richard J. Bord & Robert E. O'Connor, The Gender Gap in Environmental Attitudes: The Case of
Perceived Vulnerability to Risk, 78 Soc. Sc. Q. 830 (1997) (presenting survey data evidence that women are
more concerned than men about environmental risks for global warming and hazardous chemical waste sites);
Debra J. Davidson & William R. Freundenberg, Gender and Environmental Risk Concerns: A Review and Analy-
sis of Available Research, 28 ENV'T & BEHAV. 302, 309-16 (1996) (analyzing the results of seventy-five published
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In addition to explicit measures of affective variables, there is also research about
people's implicit associations, attitudes, and cognitions. 65 Recent implicit measures
of life satisfaction permit analysis of cultural and ethnic differences in subjective
well-being. 66 Similarly, implicit measures of risk attitude facilitate analysis of
whether there are gender differences in risk behavior.267 Finally, implicit measures
of law-abidingness facilitate research about gender differences in an individual's
propensity to abide by laws.26
D. Regulating Timing of Voluntary Securities Disclosures
All the above considerations about affective and subjective well-being impacts of
mandated securities disclosures also will apply to SEC rules that regulate the timing
of certain voluntary securities information disclosures. A motivation for such rules
as the prohibitions against so-called gun-jumping in registered public offerings is
the propensity for people who receive more favorable information first and then
less favorable information second to behave differently than if they receive both
more and less favorable information simultaneously. While this is a legitimate con-
cern, the focus of gun-jumping is on the cognitive impacts of selective versus non-
selective disclosures. Analyzing affective and subjective well-being impacts of such
rules should and would also incorporate such affective impacts of selective versus
non-selective disclosures as fear about possibly not yet disclosed bad news and re-
lief over learning at once about both good prospects and bad "risk factors" of a
particular security.
There is experimental evidence that people accelerate negative experiences to
avoid dreading them and delay positive experiences to enjoy savoring them. 69 This
data means that investors can speed up or delay their investment decisions in re-
sponse to perceived bad or good news from disclosures. There is also robust experi-
reports and studies about gender and environmental risk attitudes); Melissa L. Finucane et al., Gender, Race,
and Perceived Risk: The 'White Male' Effect, 2 HEALTH RISK & Soc'Y 159, 163-69 (2000) (presenting survey data
about how people of different races and genders perceive risks); James Flynn et al., Gender, Race, and Perception
of Environmental-Health Risks, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 1101 (1994) (finding race and gender differences in risk
perception in the U.S.); Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-
Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465 (2007) (proposing cultural status anxiety to
explain the "white male effect"); Theresa A. Satterfield et al., Discrimination, Vulnerability, and Justice in the
Face of Risk, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 115, 124-27 (2004) (reexamining "the white male effect").
265. See Marianne Bertrand et al., Implicit Discrimination, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 94 (2005). See generally
Welcome to Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/research/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
266. See Do-Yeong Kim, The Implicit Life Satisfaction Measure, 7 ASIAN J. SoC. PSYCHOL. 236, 257-58
(2004).
267. See Richard Ronay & Do-Yeong Kim, Gender Differences in Explicit and Implicit Risk Attitudes: A So-
cially Facilitated Phenomenon, 45 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 397 (2006).
268. B. Atwood & Do-Yeong Kim, Gender Differences in Explicit and Implicit Law-Abidingness (2005)
(unpublished manuscript).
269. George Loewenstein, Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption, 97 ECON. 1. 666, 670
(1987). See generally Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the
Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. Scl. 185 (2001).
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mental evidence that people utilize a peak-end rule to form global retrospective
evaluations of their affective experiences over time.270 In other words, an individ-
ual's global retrospective affective evaluation of an experience over time is not
equal to merely the sum (or integral) of momentary affective experiences, but in-
stead equals the average of peak affective response and ending affective response.
This finding suggests that investors have a preference for improving sequences of
securities disclosures and outcomes. Many experimental studies in other contexts
already have demonstrated that people have a preference for improving profiles of
experiences.27'
E. Regulating Audiences of Voluntary Securities Disclosures
Related to restrictions on when securities issuers may engage in voluntary securities
disclosures are regulations mandating to whom securities issuers may engage in
voluntary securities information transmission. An example is Regulation FD (Fair
Disclosure), which the SEC promulgated in 2000 and which prohibits securities
issuers from making certain securities disclosures to selected analysts before they
are made publicly. 272 A pair of mantras often made by Congress, judges, and SEC
regulators is that of keeping or making securities markets a "level playing field," 273
and protecting or promoting the integrity of securities markets. Both of these man-
tras have strong emotional appeal because they suggest that a goal of securities
regulation is to make securities markets a safe place for investing by apocryphal
widows and orphans. These mantras also show up in the federal common law of
insider trading and jurisprudence of Rule 10b-5,274 because outsiders fear that in-
siders will take informational advantage of informationally challenged outsiders.
But are recitations of these mantras just merely rhetoric calculated to garner emo-
tional appeal?
The SEC should measure and quantify affective impacts of alternative securities
disclosures upon the confidence, faith, and trust of different audiences of both
investors and non-investors by examining how various policies directly affect inves-
tor and non-investor anxiety or stress, and in so doing indirectly affect such tradi-
tional economic and financial variables as prices, volatility, and volume of
securities. Experimental research provides insights about how trust affects investor
270. Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY
19-21 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
271. See George Loewenstein & Nachum Sicherman, Do Workers Prefer Increasing Wage Profiles?, 9 J. LAB.
EcoN. 67, 69 (1991); George F. Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Preferences for Sequences of Outcomes, 100
PSYCHOL. REV. 91 (1993). See generally NICK WILKINSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
208-09 (2008).
272. 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2006); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7,881,
Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249).
273. Literally and naturally, this metaphor raises a drainage problem because a level playing field will not
drain by itself.
274. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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behavior,27 5 and how to prevent fraud in laboratory settings.2 76 Empirical research
finds that different potential audiences of securities disclosures exhibit different
investment behavior. For example, more optimistic people invest more in individ-
ual stocks and save more,277 and more social people (that is, those who attend
church and visit their neighbors) are more likely to purchase stocks.27
F. Overall Affect from a System of Securities Regulations
The above discussion about fears over bad consequences resulting from inequities
in information highlights an important feature of a system of securities regulation
as opposed to a system's constituent individual regulations. There is an emotional
sense of well-being or peace of mind from knowing that an overarching regulatory
system exists. Such a state of calmness is distinct from any specific emotional im-
pacts that specific regulations might produce. Such senses of ease or uneasiness
exist not only about financial risks, but also non-financial risks, such as that from
the mad cow disease, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy.2 79 Of course, such an
affective sense of security might be false and lead investors to invest only in (U.S.)
securities, and insufficiently diversify their portfolios across other non-(U.S. secur-
ity) financial assets."' What both media coverage and individual investors focus
most of their attention upon is a big picture of securities regulation or its lack
thereof because they lack the required interest, patience, skills, and time for closer
examination and more detailed study.
Securities analysts, issuers, lawyers, and professional investors have the abilities,
.incentives, resources, and training required to analyze specific regulations and
changes in them. But a big picture gestalt view of a system of securities regulation
means that public appearances might be as or even more important than private
realities in terms of affective impacts. The triumph of appearance over substance
occurs not only in securities regulation, but also in matters involving foreign pol-
icy, international relations, and terrorism.2"' A concern for keeping up appearances
of doing something can explain prosecutorial decisions to investigate such high-
275. Amy K. Choy & Ronald R. King, Independence, Trust, and Justice: An Experimental Investigation 3
(2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=892332).
276. Michael Daniel Guttentag et al., "Sarbanes-Oxley in the Laboratory: Using Experimental Economics to
Study Fraud Prevention," Presentation at the American Association of Law and Economics (May 5, 2006),
available at http://www.amlecon.org/2006-program.pdf.
277. Manju Puri & David T. Robinson, Optimism and Economic Choice, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 73 (2007).
278. See Harrison Hong et al., Social Interaction and Stock-Market Participation, 59 J. FIN. 137 (2004).
279. See, e.g., John Eldrige & Jacquie Reilly, Risk and Relativity: BSE and the British Media, in THE SOCIAL
AMPLIFICATION OF RISK 138 (Nick F. Pidgeon et al. eds., 2003); Douglas Powell, Mad Cow Disease and the
Stigmatization of British Beef, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA: UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC CHALLENGES TO MOD-
ERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 219 (J. Flynn et al. eds., 2001).
280. See Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEx. L. REV. 777,
840-50 (2000).
281. Jules Lobel & George Loewenstein, Emote Control: The Substitution of Symbol for Substance in Foreign
Policy and International Law, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1045, 1047 (2005).
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profile celebrities as Martha Stewart for alleged securities fraud upon her share-
holders caused by her declarations of not having committed insider trading,282 or
Leona Helmsley for mail fraud and tax evasion.283
G. Unconscious Affect and Securities Investing
The above paragraph is reminiscent of 1972 economics Nobel Laureate Kenneth
Arrow's trichotomy of decision areas or categories, namely active, monitored, and
passive.2"4 Because conscious attention is a scarce resource for all humans, most
individual investors are consciously processing information about very few securi-
ties, while monitoring "out of the corner of their eyes" a few more securities that
are related in some way, and passively ignoring the vast majority of securities. In a
world of limited attention, media coverage should affect securities prices and trad-
ing. Recent research finds empirical evidence that media coverage is correlated with
stock price responses to earnings announcements. 2" There is also empirical data
indicating a relationship between media coverage and mutual fund flows. 286 Media
coverage may play an important role in corporate governance reforms 2 7 because as
Justice Louis Brandeis famously said: "[p] ublicity is justly commended as a remedy
for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policemen." 28 There is evidence of greater pro-
company bias in media coverage during stock market booms than busts.28 9
Recent empirical research also has investigated roles that attention plays in finan-
cial investment.2 ° If people do not focus their conscious attention, they often util-
ize their unconscious attention. Affective responses are often automatic, reflexive,
and unconscious, as opposed to deliberative responses that are controlled, reflec-
282. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Reflections on Scienter (and the Securities Fraud Case Against Martha
Stewart that Never Happened), 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2006).
283. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, U.S. Jury Finds Helmsley Guilty Of Tax Evasion But Not Extortion, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 1989, at Al; William Glaberson, Helmsley Gets 4-Year Term For Tax Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1989,
at BI.
284. ARROW, supra note 7, at 50-51 (introducing this classification and providing an illustrative individual
investor example).
285. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Media and Asset Prices (Aug. 1, 2003) (unpublished manu-
script, available at http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/luigi.zingales/research/PSpapers/media.pdf).
286. Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN. 1589, 1614-16 (1998).
287. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role of the Media, in THE RIGHT TO TELL:
THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 107 (The World Bank ed., 2002).
288. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 1 (Brandeis Sch. of Law
ed., 2004), available at http://library.louisville.edu/law/brandeis/opm-ch5.html.
289. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Bubble and the Media, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPI-
TAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 83 (Peter Cornelius & Bruce Kogut eds., 2003).
290. See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, All that Glitters: The Effect of Attention and News on the Buying
Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 785 (2008); David Hirshleifer & Siew
Hong Teoh, Limited Attention, Information Disclosure, and Financial Reporting, 36 J. AcCT. & ECON. 337, 338
(2003); Lin Peng & Wei Xiong, Investor Attention, Overconfidence and Category Learning, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 563,
564 (2006).
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tive, and conscious.29" ' In fact, "feelings of emotion provide conscious information
about the results of such unconscious appraisals." '292 If information processing re-
sources are limited, spontaneously evoked affective reactions, instead of consciously
deliberated cognitions, tend to have a larger impact on choice. Individuals then
may invest in a security, which is superior upon some more affective dimensions,
but inferior along other more cognitive dimensions. Finally, a recent model of in-
vestors paying selective attention to information predicted and found support in
three Scandinavian data sets that investors will check on the value of their portfo-
lios more frequently in rising markets, but will behave like ostriches hiding their
heads in sand when markets are falling or flat.293 In this model, learning the value
of an investor's portfolio not only provides more information, but also increases
the psychological impact of information on utility.
H. Financial Literacy and Securities Educational Campaigns
There is evidence of both widespread financial illiteracy in the United States and
links between financial illiteracy and financial mistakes, restricted stock market
participation, and lack of retirement planning.294 Recent empirical research found
that people who plan for their retirement accumulate more wealth than individuals
who do not.295 But, as educators, parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, and former stu-
dents, we certainly should know that not everyone processes information uni-
formly in terms of their comprehension and pace of learning. Individuals possess
different affective styles and personalities that influence the speeds at and manners
in which they learn. Just as individual patients have different learning styles to-
wards health and medical information, individual investors have different learning
styles towards financial information. For example, recent empirical research found
that some families filing for bankruptcy are highly motivated and optimistic to
learn from a financial education course, while other families filing for bankruptcy
291. See Matthew D. Lieberman, Reflexive and Reflective Judgment Processes: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience
Approach, in SOCIAL JUDGMENTS: IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT PROCESSES 44-67 (J.P. Forgas et al. eds., 2003),
available at http://www.scn.ucla.edu/pdf/SydneyDM.pdf.
292. Gerald L. Clore, For Love or Money: Some Emotional Foundations of Rationality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1151, 1159 (2005).
293. Niklas Karlsson et al., The 'Ostrich Effect': Selective Attention to Information About Investments 3
(May 5, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=772125).
294. Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Retirement Preparedness: Evidence and
Implications for Financial Education, Bus. ECON., Jan. 2007, at 35, 39; Annamaria Lusardi, Financial Literacy:
An Essential Tool for Informed Consumer Choice? (Nov. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://
www.dartmouth.edu/-alusardi/Papers/Literacy-Tool.pdf); see also Lewis Mandell, Financial Literacy: Does It
Matter?, in FINANCIAL LITERACY FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH (Thomas A. Lucey & Kathleen S. Cooter eds.,
2008).
295. Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Baby Boomer Retirement Security: The Roles of Planning,
Financial Literacy, and Housing Wealth, 54 J. MONETARY ECON. 205, 214-15 (2007).
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are quite resistant and skeptical about learning from a financial education course.29 6
Financial literacy education that is touted to be a form of investor democratization
and empowerment is an example of a policy that has both positive and negative
affective impacts. It induces a short-term positive affective response, but is likely to
be akin to an opiate for the masses because people think that they have learned
something and therefore undertake more financial risks, but in reality they really
know very little still and if the value of their financial purchases crash they are likely
to suffer a longer-term affective response of blaming themselves for the fallout.
Professor Lauren Willis makes compelling arguments against regulators attempting
to increase financial literacy. She points out quite rightly so that people "generally
do not serve as their own doctors and lawyers and for reasons of efficient division
of labor alone, generally should not serve as their own financial experts." '97 She
also reviews what empirical data there is and concludes there is negligible statisti-
cally significant empirical support for financial literacy education being effective.29
People range in their financial comfort level from anxiety and avoidance,299 to
compulsion and obsession."" This means that financial literacy not only has to be
taught, but also learned. Because financial knowledge has public good aspects, and
financial misinformation has public bad characteristics, in terms of spillover eco-
nomic and financial effects on society, there are likely to be well-known market
failures when private firms provide such information. There is also evidence that
conducting financial education at workplaces has desirable impacts in terms of
higher participation in employee-directed pension plans and greater savings.3"'
There is recent experimental evidence that competing affective information in-
fluences less numerate people more than highly numerate people,0 2 and that highly
numerate people and less numerate people retrieve different affective meaning
296. Deborah Thorne & Katherine M. Porter, Financial Education for Bankrupt Families: Attitudes and
Needs 1-6 (Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies, Res. Paper No. 07-30, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cflm?abstract id= 1032968.
297. See Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy, 94 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2008). available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1105384 (arguing that although the vision of an educated
investing public is powerfully seductive, it also is one lacking empirical support).
298. Lauren E. Willis, Evidence and Ideology in Assessing the Effectiveness of Financial Literacy Education
(Univ. Penn. Law Sch. Public Law Res. Paper No. 08-08), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1098270 (identifying pervasive and serious limitations in the current empirical work that regula-
tors use as evidence to support financial literacy education programs).
299. See generally Alan B. Krueger, Are We Having More Fun Yet? Categorizing and Evaluating Changes in
Time Allocation (2007) (unpublished manuscript) (documenting evidence that many Americans find house-
hold management and financial planning to be quite painful and stressful).
300. See Mad Money (CNBC television show).
301. B. Douglas Bernheim & Daniel M. Garrett, The Effects of Financial Education in the Workplace: Evi-
dence from a Survey of Households, 87 J. PUB. EcoN. 1487, 1488 (2003); Esther Duflo & Emmanuel Saez,
Participation and Investment Decisions in a Retirement Plan: The Influence of Colleagues' Choices, 85 J. PUB.
ECON. 121, 122 (2002); Esther Duflo & Emmanuel Saez, The Role of Information and Social Interactions in
Retirement Plan Decisions: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 122 Q.J. ECON. 815, 816 (2003).
302. Ellen Peters et al., Numeracy and Decision Making, 17 PSYCHOL. Sci. 407, 410-11 (2006) (presenting
this data).
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from probabilities and numerical comparisons.3  Due to innumeracy, °4 many in-
dividuals experience anxiety towards mathematics and learning subjects involving
mathematics, such as economics and finance. Additionally, financial and non-fi-
nancial media coverage of economic and finance matters tends to be alarmist."5
For example, some investors, politicians, and even financial regulators have a fear
of those financial instruments that are called financial derivatives, 306 without un-
derstanding them because they recall hearing about financial derivatives being in-
volved with several high-profile corporate and municipal bankruptcies." 7 To be
clear, financial derivatives can be misused, but they also can be utilized for finan-
cially legitimate and sound reasons.3 8
There are reasons to focus educational initiatives and informational campaigns
especially on two particularly vulnerable populations, namely individuals who are"at-risk" of having financial problems and novel financial decision-makers, such as
young people. Since 2001, the Credit Card Project of the Saint Paul Foundation has
been engaging in and researching such targeted financial education initiatives.30 9 As
part of this project, the University of Minnesota Department of Family Social Sci-
ence Professor Virginia Zuiker developed an online one-credit course about credit
card management."' Another part of this project is entitled "What's My Score," a
public awareness and educational campaign that is designed to help college stu-
dents realize that credit scores are so crucial for their careers and lives that they
should manage them like they manage their grade point averages."'
In addition to providing optional financial education to college students, it
might be sensible to provide optional or even mandatory financial education to
high school students. Empirical evidence suggests that financial education even can
be offered successfully to elementary school children. 12 There are not only cogni-
tive benefits in requiring high school students to enroll in a course in financial
303. Id. at 411-12.
304. See generally JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL ILLITERACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(2001).
305. MARC SIEGEL, FALSE ALARM: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE EPIDEMIC OF FEAR (2005).
306. See generally Rent M. Stulz, Should We Fear Derivatives?, 18 I. ECON. PERSP. 173, 190-91 (2004) (an-
swering the question in its title in the negative).
307. Peter H. Huang et al., Derivatives on TV: A Tale of Two Derivatives Debacles in Prime-Time, 4 GREEN
BAG 2d 257 (2001).
308. See generally JOHN MARTHINSEN, RISK TAKERS: USERS AND ABUSES OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (2d ed.
2008).
309. Kimberly M. Gartner & Elizabeth R. Schiltz, What's Your Score? Educating College Students About Credit
Card Debt, 24 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 401, 419-31 (2005).
310. 'University of Minnesota, Freshman Survival Skills: Advice From Those Who've Been There, http://
www.collegelife.umn.edu/fsos.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
311. Whatsmyscore.org, http://www.whatsmyscore.org/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
312. Margaret S. Sherraden et al., School-Based Children's Saving Accounts for College: The I Can Save Pro-
gran, 29 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 294 (2007); see also Lewis Mandell, Teaching Young Dogs Old Tricks: The
Effectiveness of Intervention in Pre-High School Grades, in FINANCIAL LITERACY FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH,
supra note 294.
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decision-making," ' or more generally decision-making;3t 4 but also there are likely
to be affective impacts in terms of less worry about financial matters from better
understanding of and a sense of control over them. The Decision Education Foun-
dation is an example of a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization dedicated to providing
instruction at decision-making skills to at-risk students, low-income students, and
even gifted students' An example of a private sector financial educational initia-
tive is Visa's website, Practical Money Skills for Life. 16
It also might be helpful for most high school students to learn financial judg-
ment and skills if they practice making financial decisions in environments that
simulate real-life investing.317 Similar concerns apply to making high school driver
education occur in more realistic scenarios than is typically done, for example with
the latest popular music playing, perhaps too loudly and passengers in the front
and back seats talking, possibly also too loudly. Poor financial decision-making and
judgment could involve habits that are very easy to pick up, but quite hard to undo
due to irreversible or very costly to reverse consequences.
To be effective, teachers of basic financial ideas can and should make learning
engaging, fun, and relevant. 's As with other types of problem solving, financial
problem solving' is best mastered by repeated learning involving doing, reflecting,
discussing, teaching others, and repeating. Individuals can accomplish much of
their investing and retirement planning via user-friendly computer software or
web-based interactive programs. 19 A possible concern is whether teachers making
financial education fun could mislead students into failing to appreciate the seri-
ousness of investing and irreversibility of financial ruin that can result from ill-
conceived choices and mistaken assumptions. Such dangers exist if students treat
investing like playing a video game, whose initial values they can reset by declaring
313. See B. Douglas Bernheim et al., Education and Saving: The Long-Term Effects of High School Financial
Curriculum Mandates, 80 J. PUB. ECON. 435 (2001).
314. See JONATHAN BARON ET AL., GOING THROUGH THE Goop: AN INTRODUCTION To DECISION MAKING
(1989), available at http://www.sas.upenn.edu/-baron/dmtext.htm; JONATHAN BARON & REX V. BROWN,
TEACHING DECISION MAKING TO ADOLESCENTS (1991); DAVID R. HENDERSON & CHARLES L. HOOPER, MAKING
GREAT DECISIONS IN BUSINESS AND LIFE (2006).
315. See Decision Education Foundation Helps Youths Develop Decision-Making Skills, SDG, Oct. 26, 2001,
http://www.sdg.com/home.nsf/sdg/AboutSDC-News-DEFHelpsYouthsDevelopSkills; Decision Education
Foundation, Welcome to DEF, http://decisioneducation.org/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
316. Practical Money Skills for Life, http://www.practicalmoneyskills.com/english/index.php (last visited
Feb. 10, 2008).
317. See Welcome to MoneySKILL, http://www.moneyskill.org (last visited Feb. 10, 2008) (providing a free,
online, interactive textbook including two real-life simulations).
318. See, e.g., BARBARA SHOTWELL & NANCY RANDOLPH GREENWAY, PASS IT ON: A PRACTICAL APPROACH
TO THE FEARS AND FACTS OF PLANNING YOUR ESTATE (2000).
319. See, e.g., Financial Engines, https://www.financialengines.com/FeContent?act=welcome (list visited
Feb. 10, 2008) (a personalized investment advisory service co-founded by William F. Sharpe, 1990 Nobel Prize-
winning economist, Joseph A. Grundfest, William A. Franke Professor of Law and Business at Stanford Law
School and Commissioner of the SEC 1985 to 1990, and Craig W. Johnson, founder and chairman of Venture
Law Group).
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personal bankruptcy upon insolvency. As is true with education in other contexts
and life in general, being mindful rather than mindless prevents accidents. 2 °
Another concern is that people will not learn because of the black swan problem,
which Nassim Taleb defined to be a random event satisfying three properties: an
extremely large impact, a small but incomputable probability ex ante, and surprise
effect.32' A related danger is that some youths could become addicted to taking
excessive financial risks because of the adrenalin rush, visceral thrills, and similarity
to gambling. There is empirical data finding that many young people start to smoke
without fully understanding the consequences of doing so and become addicted to
cigarettes because of affective and visceral influences.322 Such research suggests de-
veloping financial educational campaigns that go beyond just providing informa-
tion for people's cognitive, deliberative systems to making visceral appeals to
people's affective, emotional systems.323 Graphically and visually depicting adverse
consequences of bad credit, bankruptcy costs, financial ignorance, and monetary
ruin might scare people into developing financial acumen, curiosity, experience,
and knowledge. Another possibility is to have adults with bad credit histories talk
with financially at-risk youths. This type of targeted interactive dialogue is akin to
adolescents potentially at-risk for becoming criminals being "scared straight" by
visiting prison inmates in jail. In addition to direct information provision via pub-
lic service advertisements, such as anti-smoking campaigns, government agencies
can also disseminate such independent media coverage as an investigative public
broadcasting documentary concerning the U.S. credit card industry, which won the
Emmy Award for Outstanding Investigative Journalism 2004-05."'4 Such a financial
education "scared straight" approach uses a negative affective response of fear to
induce a positive response of motivation, but fear can also lead to paralysis and
rushed or truncated decision-making. In truth fear probably does both, but in
different measures in different people.
320. See generally ELLEN J. LANGER, MINDFULNESS (1990); ELLEN J. LANGER, THE POWER OF MINDFUL
LEARNING (1997).
321. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CHANCE IN LIFE AND IN
THE MARKETS 12 (2d ed. 2004).
322. George Loewenstein, A Visceral Account of Addiction, in SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION & POLICY 188
(Paul Slovic ed., 2001); Paul Slovic, Cigarette Smokers: Rationil Actors or Rational Fools?, in SMOKING: RISK,
PERCEPTION, & POLICY, supra, at 97; Paul Slovic, Rational Actors and Rational Fools: The Influence of Affect on
Judgment and Decision Making, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 163, 200-01 (2000).
323. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, The Joint Failure of Economic Theory and Legal Regulation, in
SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION, & POLICY, supra note 322, at 229, 271-73.
324. Frontline: Secret History of the Credit Card (PBS television broadcast Nov. 23, 2004), available at http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/view/.
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L Financial and Securities Default Rules
There is a vast legal literature about default rules.32 Because of inertia, default rules
are often very powerfully sticky.326 A natural human tendency is to not rock the
boat, or at least to value compliance with rules and norms.327 Part of our status quo
bias can be due to human satisficing and conserving on their cognitive resources.
But, another reason that most people will feel complacency towards defaults or feel
that there must be a reason for defaults to be set as they are is affective."2 Empirical
and experimental research about various default rules across countries and on-line
has considered emotional costs upon those opting away from defaults in alternative
organ donation programs. 29 Experiments involving organ donations and retire-
ment savings indicate that at least for those domains, people tend to view defaults
as policymakers' implicit recommendations or decision-making advice.330
Brigitte Madrian and Dennis F. Shea demonstrated the power of automatic en-
rollment in a company's 401(k) plan when employee's 401 (k) plan enrollment rates
jumped from 49% to 86% upon introducing automatic enrollment as their de-
fault.33" ' Behavioral economists Richard H. Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi ingeniously
utilize inertia from defaults in a financial setting to develop another plan that en-
courages retirement saving by employees. 32 Under their prescriptive savings plan,
Save More Tomorrow, also known as the SMarT plan, employees pre-commit to
dedicating 3% of all future pay raises to retirement savings. Thaler testified before a
Senate Committee panel on how to help American workers save more based upon
lessons from behavioral economics generally and empirical data and experience
with implementing SMarT particularly.333
A natural field experiment that occurred in the two neighboring states of New
Jersey and Pennsylvania demonstrates very starkly how powerfully sticky defaults
can be. Both state legislatures enacted tort reform laws requiring automobile insur-
325. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,
99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution,
96 Nw. U. L. REV. 489 (2002). But see Eric Maskin, On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 557 (2006) (critiquing Bebchuk & Gertner's rationale for penalty default rules).
326. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
327. See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 607 (2000).
328. See Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathe-
dral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 384 (1999) (finding that bargaining did not occur after judgment in a sample of
twenty nuisance lawsuits).
329. Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 ScI. 1338 (2003).
330. Craig R.M. McKenzie et al., Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults, 17 PSYCHOL. ScI. 414, 414
(2006).
331. See Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and
Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1179 (2001).
332. Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 233, at S170-71.
333. Helping Americans Save: Hearing Before the J. Economic Comm., 108th Cong. 4-7 (2004) (testimony of
Dr. Richard H. Thaler).
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ance companies to provide coverage with particular types of default rights to sue
after car accidents. In New Jersey, the default rule is that insured motorists had a
limited right to sue, but could pay higher premiums to receive a full right to sue. In
Pennsylvania, the default rule is that insured motorists had a full right to sue, but
could pay discounted premiums if they switched to a limited right to sue. Faced
with these options, approximately only 20% of New Jersey drivers opted to switch
and pay for a full right to sue. In other words, an overwhelming 80% of New Jersey
drivers opted to stay with their defaults. Approximately 75% of Pennsylvania driv-
ers opted to keep a full right to sue. In other words, only 25% of Pennsylvania
drivers opted to switch from their defaults. " 4 There is approximately a four hun-
dred fifty million dollar difference in how much drivers pay for car insurance cov-
erage in these neighboring states. " '
Affective reactions to particular default items may not only exacerbate, but also
counteract such asymmetries if they are sufficiently strong emotional responses.
Potential securities issuers can avoid those default rules in U.S. federal securities
regulation that are costly in terms of compliance by financial engineering or engag-
ing in regulatory arbitrage by taking advantage of the globalization and interna-
tionalization of securities markets. But such avoidance may have emotional impacts
in terms of undesirable public relations. Ribstein's call for humble securities regula-
tion avoids these emotional impacts of avoidance by offering companies an option
to explain why they are opting out of defaults, 336 or allowing self-certification. 37 A
similar point is true of Romano's proposal that permits firms to follow prescribed
procedures to opt out of statutory default rules.338 Just as regulatory defaults may
create salience, so can regulatory menus.3 39 But salience can evoke affective reac-
tions, some of which may contribute to, while others could also counteract, a de-
fault rule's or menu's effectiveness. Differing affective styles across people suggests
that a financial regulator should if possible customize or tailor default rules or
menus to fit various types of investors and other actors in financial markets.
]. Continual Corporate Governance Reforms
Consider these reflections about Clark's meditation on lessons that one can and
should learn from the recent experience of making changes in U.S. corporate gov-
334. Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCER-
TAINTY 35, 48 (1993) (documenting this phenomenon); see also Camerer et al., supra note 252, at 1227 n.45
(offering possible alternative signaling or costly information explanations for this phenomenon).
335. Kahneman, supra note 270, at 6.
336. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years, supra note 2.
337. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to Nirvana, supra note 2, at 296.
338. Romano, supra note 2, at 1596.
339. See Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2006); Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default
Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical Examination (Yale Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 335, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=924578.
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ernance.34° Clark observed that a more deliberative, rational, and knowledge-based
regulatory process is unlikely to be realistic in part due to widespread outrage in
response to regulatory failures and loud clamoring for major changes. Clark ob-
served that reformist impulses are based primarily upon emotions that motivate
actions?41 Clark proposed that regulations (1) enable and require that regulators
like the SEC authorize, fund, perform, and perhaps even mandate data collection
and empirical analysis studying those regulations over time; (2) empower, en-
courage, and perhaps even require that regulators reassess some regulations period-
ically in light of experience and evidence and respond accordingly; and (3) spell
out clear timetables for both (1) and (2).
A Chinese proverb that advocates reverence for one's elders states that: "youth is
a gift of nature, while age is a work of art." A corollary of this proposition is that we
are all works in progress. Along similar lines, Clark's analysis viewed regulations as
being all works in progress, which can benefit from periodic opportunities to learn
and in light of such learning, revise their current particular content within longer-
term general principles. As Clark noted, a serious potential practical problem with
such an enlightened regulatory perspective is the strength of a deep-seated human
desire for closure, which is particularly strong in the face of moral outrage and
reform frenzy. Another affective difficulty that Clark discussed is that emotionally
aroused individuals tend to prefer bright-line rules as opposed to vague standards.
On the other hand, Clark offered some reasons to hope that his proposal can be
implemented by appealing to regulators' natural and understandable desires to look
rational and reasonable.
Clark's novel regulatory proposal may reallocate affective impacts over time by
possibly delaying certain ones and moving others forward. As is true in general for
analyzing affective impacts, it matters relative to what benchmarks affective impacts
are measured. An analogue to Clark's "revise and reconsider" procedure is the "re-
vise and resubmit" option that reviewers at many peer-refereed journals can select
instead of simply rejecting or accepting some article submission. In this way, Clark
offered a compromise between those who passionately and strongly desire reform
and those who passionately and strongly resist change. Clark's proposal envisioned
an ongoing process of reassessing and revising regulations that is akin to how most
people feel and think science usually does and should proceed. But, just as there are
scientific revolutions,342 there could be and perhaps there occasionally should be
revolutions in regulatory policy and principles. Clark's proposal is actively experi-
mentalist and scientific in terms of its philosophical approach. It thus appears to
represent a stark departure from a legal culture of courts being bound by precedent
and legal actors in general respecting stare decisis. But, even within legal culture,
340. See generally Clark, supra note 2.
341. See Lobel & Lowenstein, supra note 281, at 1046-48 (warning about dangers of emotional appeals to
policy).
342. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996).
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change sometimes occurs, albeit often slowly and only eventually. For example,
landmark cases, such as the U.S. Supreme Court ruling ending school segregation,
Brown v. Board of Education,4' often put a legal end to long-standing practices,
once those practices are socially perceived no longer to be appropriate.
Clark's proposal for incremental regulation echoed Nobel Laureate Kenneth J.
Arrow's observation that "recondite calculation of gains and losses does not lead to
great enthusiasm. It does not offer magic solutions to problems. A truly rational
discussion of collective action in general or in specific contexts is necessarily com-
plex, and what is even worse, necessarily incomplete and unresolved."'44 Clark's
"live and learn" type of regulatory policy and reform is consistent with manage-
ment applications of real options theory, which formally models how decision-
makers can profit from opportunities to adapt behavior in light of learning new
information,34 and viewing lawsuits as real options.'46
Clark's proposed cautious regulatory gradualism is also consistent with a con-
ceptual framework, experimental research, and empirical results by several behav-
ioral decision theorists.'47 Finally, Clark's view that learning about and improving
regulation should be ongoing resonates with recent neuroeconomic research find-
ing that even one-shot individual human choice is a dynamic process. 4 In other
words, people continue to engage in evaluations and affective reactions after they
already have made their choices. Such post-decision evaluations and feelings in
turn influence how they make future choices. These post-decision-making evalua-
tions and feelings also may provide neuroscientific explanations for and founda-
tions of such observed behavioral phenomena as endowment effects and sunk cost
reasoning. There is a danger that continual reassessment and reevaluation of regu-
latory policy might induce a ruminating and stressful organizational and political
culture of seeking unattainable perfection as opposed to being satisfied if things are"good enough." Such a danger exists whenever decision-makers are "maximizers"
343. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
344. ARROW, supra note 7, at 17.
345. See generally AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1994);
REAL OPTIONS AND INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (Eduardo S. Schwartz & Lenos Trigeorgis eds., 2004);
LENOS TRIGEORGIS, REAL OPTIONS: MANAGERIAL FLEXIBILITY AND STRATEGY IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION
(1996).
346. Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective,
58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1271 (2006); Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of Attorney's
Fees in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1943, 1946-47 (1998) (deriving a real options-based
theory for calculating risk multipliers of attorney's fees in federal civil rights litigation); Peter H. Huang, Law-
suit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous Litigation Games, 23 REV. LITIG. 47, 50 (2004) (offering a real
options analysis of litigation abandonment options).
347. See generally JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER (1993).
348. See John Dickhaut et al., The Role of Differential Outcome Feedback on Transitivity, Heart Rate,
Galvanic Skin Response and fMri, Presentation at the Third Annual Meeting of the Society for
Neuroeconomics (Sept. 15, 2005).
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instead of "satisficers. '349 Thus, it might be fortuitous that organizations such as
regulatory agencies, because of their bureaucratic, collective, deliberative, and hier-
archical natures, tend to satisfice instead of maximize.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This Article advocated an accounting, inclusion, measurement, and quantification
of affective impacts of securities regulations. This Article analyzed reasons for SEC
reliance upon a sort of rhetorical CBA to evaluate and promulgate securities regula-
tions. This Article found that the organizing statutes of the SEC are inconclusive
over whether considering "efficiency" mandates that CBA should be the only meth-
odology for choosing among different proposed rules and regulations. CBA does
not account for, include, measure, nor quantify affective impacts and thus ignores
important information about proposed securities regulations. But, as former Com-
missioner of Labor Statistics Katherine G. Abraham has pointed out, "[wlithout
accurate information on overall economic conditions, workers, firms, voters, and
policymakers are flying blind-or at least peering through a thick fog."3 ' This Arti-
cle addressed conceptual and measurement issues that arise with analyzing the af-
fective impacts of alternative categories of securities and financial regulations:
mandatory disclosures; so-called gun-jumping rules in public registered offerings;
financial education campaigns; default rules and menus; and statutory provisions
that provide for continual reassessment and revision of regulations. Although this
Article has focused on incorporating affective impacts into analyzing securities reg-
ulations, much of its analysis also applies to non-financial individual and social
risks. In fact, much of the contentiousness in assessing costs and benefits in envi-
ronmental, health, and safety regulations comes from CBA devaluing, ignoring, or
simply missing a number of affective impacts and emotional values, including mor-
ally based affect in particular. Indeed, affective reactions are likely to be just as, if
not more, important for non-financial risks than financial risks." ' A related article
analyzes affective impacts of risk regulation generally.352
349. See Barry Schwartz et al., Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness Is A Matter of Choice, 83 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1178 (2002).
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